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REYES-OVALLES, ANABEL Statelessness and Human Trafficking: A 
Case Study of Haitian-Dominicans. Departments(s) of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies and Political Science 
 
ADVISORS: Meade, Teresa and Marso, Lori 	  
This thesis explores whether stateless persons are more vulnerable to human 
trafficking and why. My primary example will be the 2013 Dominican Republic 
Supreme Court ruling, which rendered Haitian-Dominicans stateless. To understand 
current Dominican Republic-Haiti relations, this thesis addresses contentious historical 
accounts of these countries’ relations, particularly from the 1960’s to 2015. This case 
study will focus on the vulnerable relationship of citizens to a state, specifically the 
vulnerability of defacto statelessness versus dejure statelessness. I argue that dejure 
statelessness is a particularly severe condition that contributes to human trafficking.  
 
This thesis draws upon both primary and secondary sources including, published 
reports, journals, news film footage, and documentaries. Ethnographic research and 
interviews focusing on Dominican-Haitian relations will also be discussed in the later 
chapters. The qualitative and quantitative data collected throughout the thesis focuses on 
the way internal factors, such as human insecurity, discrimination and lack of dealing 
with structural problems of statelessness and human trafficking places a stateless person 
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CHAPTER ONE- WHEN CITIZENS LOSE THEIR STATES 
I. Introduction 
Migration can be voluntary or by force— but it is always a difficult process. 
From the recent wave of Syrian refugees that have swamped Europe seeking asylum to 
the tens of thousands of Haitian-Dominicans who have lost their national citizenship, 
political turmoil continues to engender migration. Many people do not have a choice 
and leave their home country in economic pursuit; while others are forced into finding a 
new life and either adapt to their new host country or pursue ways to return back 
“home”.  
In From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can 
Change the World, Duncan Green examines restrictive migration policies and how they 
“have contributed to the proliferation of traffickers and smugglers”.1 This is a concept 
that governments do not focus on because they assume that everyone wants to come to 
a country when people immigrate. Since it becomes very difficult to monitor who 
leaves and comes back from a country, migration also undermines human security 
because of the many ways that migrants are exploited through forms of human 
trafficking. 
 As Duncan argues, “human trafficking is the largest criminal activity 
worldwide (9.5 billion every year just by trafficking; further revenues estimated in 32 
billion dollars),” demonstrating that illicit migration occurs on a daily basis.2 By 
undermining human security, states destabilize the rights that a migrant has acquired by 
being part of a state. It should not matter what state the migrant comes from since 
regulating migration will engender new ways of safeguarding any migrant. Therefore, it 
is key to regulate and coordinate migration regionally and globally in order to secure a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Green, Duncan. From poverty to power: how active citizens and effective states can change the world. 
Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana. 2012. 9. Print.	  2	  Green, Duncan. From poverty to power: how active citizens and effective states can change the world. 	   , .  t  t    ti  iti   ff ti  t t    t  l . 
Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana. 2012. 11. Print.	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person’s human security status. However, this becomes especially more difficult during 
non-migration contexts when a ‘citizen’ is considered stateless by law. In order to 
address the issue of how statelessness puts a person at a higher risk of becoming 
trafficked, I will establish the following: a brief history of statelessness, what does it 
mean to be stateless in terms of human security, and how de jure statelessness leads to a 
vulnerability of becoming trafficked.  
II. The Concept of Citizenship 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly Council created the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to acknowledge inherent human rights. The 
UDHR states, “everyone has the right to a nationality” and that “no-one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his [her] nationality.3” Although the declaration was proclaimed 
as a common standard for all nations to uphold, people in many parts of the world 
continue living without a link to a state and lack the security that such citizenship can 
provide. 
Citizenship is usually obtained in two ways:  birth on the territory of the state or 
birth through descent— meaning a parent who is a national. Birth through descent, also 
known as Jus Sanguini is most common throughout most parts of the world, meanwhile 
birth right nationality— Jus Soli— can be seen mostly in the Americas.4 Arguably, 
there are complications with both Jus Soli and Jus Sanguini in that many states tend to 
apply a combination of the two and are not conclusive with their process of nationality. 
At the same time, restrictive unconditional basis for citizenship has thought to be a 
contributing factor to inequality amongst nations and statelessness due to a conflict of 
nationality laws. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations Human Rights. United Nations. Web. 7 
Nov. 2015. 
4 Migration Policy Institute: “Citizenship in a Globalized World” by Greta Gilbertson, January 2006.   
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III. A Brief History of Statelessness: 
Statelessness is a phenomenon as old as the concept of citizenship. The United 
Nations Department of Social Affairs conducted the first ever Study of Statelessness in 
1949.5 The study focuses on the difference between a person in possession of a legal 
personality and a person not considered as a national by any state under the operation of 
its law. This is mainly because “[the] law recognizes the State as the sole authority 
responsible for determining the rules of governing the attribution of its own 
nationality”.6 Consequently, statelessness has existed due to the absence of general 
rules for the acknowledgement of nationality and the inconsistencies between the 
various national legislations.7 
Before and After the Second World War 
In the early twentieth century, people’s citizenship was mostly defined through 
the traditional primitive concept of nationality—where people transferred an attachment 
to their land.8 Consequently, before the First World War, these basic assumptions 
prohibited the existence of statelessness. However, after the First World War, ethnicity, 
language, and race became more relevant, as groups were excluded from acquiring 
citizenship following these transfers. Nevertheless, it became impossible to be stateless 
because the nation-state system, as developed through international law, was not in 
place.	  However, it was not until the territorial restructuring and social crises after the 
First World War when statelessness became of significance internationally. Thus, in 
order to understand why the issue of statelessness is relevant to today, it is important to 
recognize how the concept was recognized before and after the Second World War. 
Before the Second World War: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.5. Print.	  
6 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.5. Print. 
7 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.6. Print.	  8	  Migration Policy Institute: “Citizenship in a Globalized World” by Greta Gilbertson, January 2006.  	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Before the Second World War, there were no reliable statistics stating who was 
considered a stateless person. This is why the statistics relied mostly on refugees. 
According to data assembled by Sir John Simson, an authority on this subject, the figures 
for the main categories of refugees were as follows9: 
(a) Russian refugees: in 1922, 718,000-772,000; in 1930, 503,000-536,000; in 
1936: 355,000- 386,000. 
To these must be added about 95,000 Russian refugees in the Far East, making a total of 
about 450,000. 
(b) Armenian refugees: in 1924, 205,000; in 1930, 210,000; in 1936, 225,000. 
Of these 225,000, 134,466 had acquired Syrian or Lebanese nationality.  
(c) Spanish refugees: in 1939, 400,000. 
(d) Italian refugees: Sir John Simson estimates that in 1938 there were 10,000 
Italians living in France who could not return to Italy and 50,000 for whom return would 
have been difficult. The figure of 60,000 should be tripled to allow for the refugees’ 
families, thus bringing the total to 180,000 persons.  
(e) German refugees: at the end of 1938 the number of German refugees was 
350,000. 
Although this evidence may not be perfectly accurate, it is apparent that the 
number of refugees fluctuated yearly mostly in Europe. In addition, the concept of 
statelessness was slowly rising as seen by the example of Italy since many Italians 
refugees had difficulty in returning back home. Therefore, statelessness proves to slowly 
be added as another layer besides refugees before the Second World War. 
After the Second World War: 
   The preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) 
established in the spring of 1947, tried to estimate the number of refugees and “displaced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949. 9.Print.  
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persons” entitled to its aid and protection post-World War II. The IRO collected 
information from the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the military authorities in 
occupied Germany. 10  In May 1947, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory 
Commission gave the numbers of refugees and displaced persons entitled to receive aid 
or protection from IRO as follows: 
Figure 1. Table from ‘A Study of Statelessness’11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.9. Print.  	  11	  A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.9. Print.  
 Protection and help Protection only 
Germany 671,900 800,000 
Austria 138,800 128,500 
Belgium 5,000 ---- 
China 13,500  12,000 
Spain 482   482 
France 431,200  150,000 
Italy 146,500  146,000 
Middle East 33,000 30,000 
 Netherlands 5,000 --- 
Portugal 230 230 
United Kingdom 60,000 --- 
Sweden 40,800 --- 
Switzerland 13,200 12,000 
Turkey 1,200 1,200 
 1,562,812 1,280,912 
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Once “summed up” the balance represented the number of refugees who would 
be entitled to international protection and help from the IRO. Although not an accurate 
representation of stateless persons, the statistics on refugees’ aids took into account 
where and how these people might have became vulnerable to statelessness.  
The IRO had yearly accounts from 1947- 1948 documenting the following:  
July 1947: Protection and assistance; 704,000 refugees and displaced persons: 
protection only, 900,000 refugees (including 550,000 pre-war refugees).12 Total for the 
two categories were amounted at 1,604,000. As of July 1948: the number of persons 
assisted declined to 508,000 in the three Western Zones of Germany, 37,000 in Austria, 
25,000 in Italy, 10,000 in the Middle East, 19,000 in Czechoslovakia, the Far East, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. Total 599,000.13 These refugees were of 
some thirty different nationalities, the main ones being Poles, 253,637; Ukrainians, 99, 
946; Latvians, 72,026; Lithuanians, 43,717; Yugoslavs, 26,943; Estonians, 20, 294; 
Romanians, 15,207; Hungarians, 10,789 14(The Study of Statelessness, 9).15 Overall, 
these statistics are extremely important in understanding the increase of refugees and 
their statuses through the IRO from before the Second World War to after the Second 
World War.  
The United Nations was set up immediately after World War II and one of the 
organization’s largest tasks was dealing with the mass refugee population. The UN was 
essential in establishing the 1951 Refugee Convention during the aftermath of the 
Holocaust amongst other reasons. The 1951 Refugee Convention was a legal document, 
which helped determine the Status of Refugees by defining who is a refugee, their 
rights and the legal obligations of states.16  However, Charlotte Alfred, author of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.9. Print.	  13	  A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.9. Print.	  
14 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.9. Print. 15	  A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.9. Print.	  
16 "The 1951 Refugee Convention." UNHCR News. Web. 08 Nov. 2015. 
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article “What History Can Teach Us About The Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII”, 
mentions “some refugees languished without help for years after WWII ended”17. This 
might have been because a lot of the responsibility was placed on the United Nations to 
solve the refugee problem. Alfred concludes that there was a lot of ambiguity in the 
legal obligations of the states.18 Consequently, it is evident that one of main problems 
with the aftermath of WWII was that although there was international cooperation, 
refugee protection was a global responsibility.  
One of the difficulties of establishing statelessness as an international problem 
was that at that the time no account had been taken of stateless persons who were not 
refugees.19 It then became impossible to submit statistics concerning the number of 
stateless persons in need of international legal and political protection. Nevertheless, 
the Study of Statelessness offers some statistics on the number of refugees that at the 
time were a responsibility of the International Refugee Organization, which helped in 
deciding whom should be given legal and political protection.20 As stated in the study, 
the IRO is responsible for the repatriation or resettlement of refugees who are under its 
care, but not for the repatriated refugees or those who acquire the nationality of the 
country of re-establishment.21 
Since most refugees had never received material assistance from the IRO—only 
legal protection— many had not been accounted for. In order to determine the number 
of refugees who would require international and legal political protection, the IRO had 
to take into account the following several conditions when determining the statistics of 
refugees. These included:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Alfred, Charlotte. "What History Can Teach Us About The Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII." 
Huffington Post. 12 Sept. 2015. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.	  18	  Alfred, Charlotte. "What History Can Teach Us About The Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII." 
Huffington Post. 12 Sept. 2015. Web. 8 Nov. 2015.	  	  
19 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.7 Print.  
20 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.8.Print.  
21 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949.6.Print.  
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A. The total number of individuals who fled from their country of origin and who 
become stateless de jure or de facto. B.  The descendent of these refugees who did not acquire a nationality at birth. C. The number of those who have died since their expulsion, and those who were 
repatriated or naturalized.  D. The number of re-established refugees who would probably not require 
international protection.22 
IV. Present day Definition of Statelessness: 
After the 1954 Convention of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, it defined under international law a “stateless person” as someone “who is not 
considered as a national by any State under operation of its law”.23 However, this 
definition does not necessarily take into account how and why this person may have been 
categorized as “stateless” and thus, the Study of Statelessness offers a categorical 
definition of stateless person as de jure and de facto. De jure stateless is referred to as 
“persons who are not nationals of any State, either because at birth or subsequently they 
were not given any nationality, or because during their lifetime they lost their own 
nationality and did not acquire a new one”.24 Meanwhile, stateless persons de facto are 
“persons who, having left the country of which they were nationals, no longer enjoy the 
protection and assistance of their national authorities, either because these authorities 
refuse to grant them assistance and protection of the countries, or because they 
themselves renounce the assistance and protection of which they are nationals”.25 It is 
important to distinguish these two types of statelessness since the responsibility of the 
state for protection is different depending on the type of statelessness and the way that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949. 9.Print. 
23 "UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency." UNHCR News. Web. 08 Nov. 2015. 
24 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949. 8. Print.  
25 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949. 8.Print. 	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citizenship law is practiced within a state. Furthermore, it is better to speak about de jure 
and de facto unprotected persons. Generally, refugees are de facto unprotected and 
stateless persons are de jure unprotected.26  
Criteria of statelessness  
In order to understand what statelessness is, it is best understood by defining 
what statelessness is not. According to the UNHCR guidelines and the Handbook on 
Protection of Stateless Persons, statelessness encompasses some of the following27:  
1. Statelessness occurs in both migration and non-migration a context, therefore, a person 
does not need to have crossed an international border. 
2. It is not relevant how the person came to be without a nationality or whether there is 
the possibility for the person to acquire a nationality by taking some kind of action, 
however, what is relevant is whether, the person is considered a national of any state. 
3. For a person to be “stateless” it does not require proving the lack of recognition as a 
national by all of the world’s states.  
4. For a person to be considered “stateless” it does not matter if there are nationality laws 
in practice, but how the authorities interpret the law. 
These are some of the criteria taken into consideration when defining what it 
means to be a stateless person, versus a migrant or a refugee. A stateless person can also 
be a refuge in certain instances, for example, if they have fled their country due to a fear 
of persecution. However, the difference between a stateless person and a refugee is 
important in that asylum or nationality is almost always granted based on certain factual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Under The 1954 Convention Relating To, and The Status Of Stateless Persons. Handbook on 
Protection of Stateless Persons .UNHCR.org. 2014. Web. 7 Nov. 2015	  27	  Under The 1954 Convention Relating To, and The Status Of Stateless Persons. Handbook on 
Protection of Stateless Persons .UNHCR.org. 2014. Web. 7 Nov. 2015. 
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links between a person and a state: either links through family or through territory, 
something that de jure stateless lack.  
Causes of Statelessness:  
In order to understand these different groups of stateless persons, de jure and de 
facto, it is essential to comprehend the causes of statelessness and how they are 
classified. The causes of statelessness may be classified in five groups 28: 
1. Deprivation of nationality as a penalty. This factor causes de jure statelessness 
during a person’s lifetime. 
2. Inadequacy and conflict of national legislations concerning nationality, which causes 
de jure statelessness either from birth or later. 
3. One of the most common, racial, religious, or political persecution. This factor 
causes de jure statelessness when the person in their own country is deprived of his/her 
nationality because of his racial origin, religious beliefs or political sentiments. 
However, it may also cause de facto stateless when the victim has taken asylum abroad.  
4. Mass emigration of nationals caused by changes in political, social system or even 
environmental catastrophe. This factor causes de facto statelessness of a person who 
leaves his/her country. If, after he has left, that country withdraws his nationality, he 
becomes stateless de jure.  
5. The inadequacy of the provisions relating to nationality contained in treaties bringing 
about territorial settlement or the defective application of such treatise. This factor 
causes de jure statelessness during a person’s lifetime.  
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From these categories, it is evident that de facto statelessness and de jure 
statelessness are in fact intertwined. However, it is much easier to become de jure 
stateless rather than de facto stateless because states have a very restrictive concept of 
nationality when following jus sanguini citizenship policies instead of jus soli.  
However, in Critiquing the Categorisation of the Stateless, Chickera argues that 
the present day categorization of statelessness is insufficient and unjust. For instance, 
Chickera states that, 
“it establishes a protection hierarchy— some de jure stateless persons benefit 
from the protection of the 1954 Convention, while other de jure stateless 
persons (those who are not legally staying in a country) only partially benefit 
from Convention protection and de facto stateless persons do not benefit from 
any protection at all (unless they are refugees). Secondly, there are persons and 
communities who are difficult to categorize as either de jure or de facto stateless 
due to their particular circumstances or the lack of personal documents. These 
persons fall into a grey area, and their protection may depend on whether a 
generous approach is taken— and they are considered de jure stateless— or 
not”.29  
As such Chickera proposes an alternative approach to defining statelessness 
called the “ineffective nationality” test. It is based on the premised that statelessness is 
the violation of the right to a nationality, and occurs when a person has no nationality, 
or when his or her nationality is rendered ineffective. 30 In theory, this “ineffective 
nationality” test does sound promising in that it would help to reestablish a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Chickera, Gilhan De. "Critiquing Categarisation of the Stateless." 52. Equal Rights Trust, July 2010. 
Web. 1 Mar. 2016.	  30	  Chickera, Gilhan De. "Critiquing Categarisation of the Stateless." 53. Equal Rights Trust, July 2010. 
Web. 1 Mar. 2016.	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concrete definition of statelessness, however, since the concept of statelessness must be 
applied internationality, it would be very difficult to practice an effective nationality 
test in every stateless situation. As such, this is why this thesis utilizes the international 
concepts of de jure and de facto stateless defined by the 1954 Convention. Although the 
international conventional definition does open up a grey area of statelessness, most 
countries and international organizations recognize it.  
 
Cases of statelessness: 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 
least 60 million people displaced globally now.31  These include asylum seekers, 
refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and stateless. Out of these 60 million 
people who are displaced globally, more than 15 million people are said to be currently 
stateless.32 According to the Study of Statelessness and the UNHCR, these are some of 
the most notable cases of statelessness33:  
1. Statelessness due to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union 
continues to affect over 600,000 people.  
2. In West Africa, the estimated stateless population in Côte d'Ivoire is 700,000, many 
of who were migrants of Burkinabé descent who were not eligible for Ivorian 
nationality after the country's independence from France in 1960. 
3. More than 1 million people in Myanmar's Rakhine state are stateless on the basis of 
the current citizenship law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 "UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency." UNHCR News. Web. 08 Nov. 2015. 
32 Waas, Laura Van. "The World’s Stateless: A New Report on Why Size Does and Doesn’t Matter." 
European Network on Statelessness. Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 9 Nov. 
2015. 
33 UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency." UNHCR News.  Web. 08 Nov. 2015.	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4. Many descendants of Palestinian refugees live in countries that are parts of the Arab 
League, which denies citizenship to Palestinians.  
5. One of the most recent cases and what my case study will be based on, the 
Dominican Republic where a Constitutional Court ruling in 2013 applied new 
nationality criteria retroactively and affected the nationality status of more than tens 
of thousands of people of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic. 
All of these cases represent the history of statelessness and how poorly it continues to 
be treated. Although many stateless persons have received some kind of repatriation, 
there are many stateless persons whom have not wanted to self- identify since many 
times there is no consideration for them. There is also a lack of adequate data collection 
and gap in data collection tools, which results in insufficient data actually being reported. 
It is imperative to take into account the different cases of statelessness around the world 
and what can be learned from them. 
Contrastingly to the notion that being stateless is immoral, there are theorists that 
believe the contrary. For example, in The Sovereign: An Exploration of the Right be 
Stateless, author Clark Hanjian addresses the question whether every person has the 
fundamental right to be stateless?34 Hanjian offers two distinct arguments in support of 
this claim, including35:  
1. The Fundamental Human Right Argument: whereas the liberty to be stateless 
meets the essential criteria used to establish the existence of a fundamental 
human right, the liberty to be stateless can reasonable be regarded as a 
fundamental human right. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Hanjian, Clark. The Sovrein: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless. Vineyard Haven: MA: 
Polyspire, 2003. 24.Print. 
35 Hanjian, Clark. The Sovrein: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless. Vineyard Haven: MA: 
Polyspire, 2003. 26. Print.	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2. The Consent Argument: whereas citizenship is a relationship contingent upon 
the consent of the individual, human beings necessarily retain the liberty to be 
stateless.  
Within these arguments, he defines and defends different premises all concluding 
that every right bears some corresponding obligation. Thus, Hanjian argues that there are 
those who choose to be stateless for their own reasons and that states should not be 
involved in these decisions. Although, Hanjian does make an important point, he does 
acknowledge that there are disadvantages of being a “Sovereign”, including: no 
government protection of human rights, government assistance, government interference, 
discriminations, difficulty maintaining a permanent residence, difficulty in International 
Travel and permanence of status 36. At the same time, Hanjian mentions that there are 
advantages such as integrity, adventure, political freedom, formal neutrality, and social 
transformation37. Hanjuan makes very important points in regards to statelessness and in 
regards to choosing to become statelessness, however, does not address those that do not 
choose to become stateless— which is usually the case.  
Nevertheless, one of the most important aspects of understanding a stateless person is 
their rate of vulnerability and protection. Many people assume that there will always be 
some type of international intervention or domestic entity that will be in charge of 
protecting people whom are not citizens, as often occurs with refugees. However, 
stateless persons are often confused with refugees or displaced persons, and this is not 
always the case. According to Peter van Krieken, UNHCR regional program officer in 
Addis Ababa, and author of “The High Commissioner for Refugees and Stateless 
Persons”, “stateless persons can be considered as refugees, as they might have a well 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Hanjian, Clark. The Sovrein: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless. Vineyard Haven: MA: 
Polyspire, 2003.30. Print. 
37 Hanjian, Clark. The Sovrein: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless. Vineyard Haven: MA: 
Polyspire, 2003. 29.Print.	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a particular social group or political opinion, and are unwilling or unable to avail 
themselves of the protection of … the country of habitual residence”. 38 Nonetheless, the 
main difference as Krieken addresses in his article is the aspect of “unable” and 
“unwilling”. Stateless persons are normally unable to invoke any protection, while 
asylum-seekers with a nationality are normally unwilling to avail themselves of the 
protection of their country of nationality.39 Thus, this is relevant throughout the different 
cases of historical statelessness mentioned before in that more than half of the refugees 
become so vulnerable that they eventually ended up becoming stateless persons.  
V. How Statelessness Leads to Human Insecurity and Beyond 
The notion of national security was first established by states in order to ascertain 
their capability to protect their territory. Through an emphasis on nationalism, the 
concept of the state has helped nations emphasize that citizens rely on the government for 
national protection. As Weber successfully claims, only the state has the right to 
monopolize the legitimacy of the use of violence within a given territory in order to 
secure such security. For past centuries, states have followed this model and utilized 
tactics, such as force in order to maintain its territorial integrity at any costs.  
State security has traditionally relied more on protecting states from international 
violence. However, although human security may be implied through state security, this 
has not always been the case. In 1994, economist Mahub ul Haq and Amartya Sen 
established the Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, which 
addressed how nations stood in regards to various dimensions of human rights. This 
report started a discourse about the inequalities and vulnerabilities that people were 
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suffering in many countries. According to New Dimensions of Human Security, human 
security comprises of two different dimensions, including: “freedom from want” and 
“freedom from fear”.40 “Freedom from want” is having the right to an adequate standard 
of living, meanwhile “freedom from fear”— refers to people being safe in all realms in 
their territory.41 Some examples include: health security, personal security, food security 
and environmental security among many others. The report showed that “only about a 
quarter of the world may at present be economically secure” and that “people go hungry 
not because there is not enough food in the world, but because they cannot afford it”. 42 
In a narrower perspective, human security focuses on freedom from violence, such as 
gendered insecurities and political conflicts. Therefore, through the dimensions of 
freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom from violence, human security 
addresses human rights issues that perpetuate inequalities within vulnerable 
communities.  
As mentioned in the Human Development Report, “the concept of security has for 
too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as 
protection of national interest in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a 
nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people”.43 This is the 
problem that the concept of human security is trying to address. Human security is 
described as the security of all people in various aspects— including economic, 
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educational, health, freedom and lack of conflict. Human security addresses the 
combination of risks and vulnerabilities within communities and then finds ways to 
protect the people to live free from want free from fear and free from violence, regardless 
of their nationality.  
Understanding global disadvantages and the rate of development of many states is 
necessary to conclude why some states hold human security at a higher status than 
others. Perhaps the lack of state aid, or the amount of state weakness or strength all plays 
a large role in the security of humans. Human security also focuses on human’s freedom 
from the fear of violence. It truly matters how much access someone has to protection in 
order to feel safe and secure in any aspect of his or her life. They may not have many 
materialistic items, but as long as they have the basic essentials of clean water, food and 
access to opportunities, they may continue their lives. However, this is not always 
possible in states where there is an inequality is distribution of resources or when 
resources are simply not given because the person is not considered part of that state. 
Therefore, one of the most difficult situations is living in a state that one does not have 
the right of freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from violence, as most 
stateless persons live.  
The journal Forced Migration Review collects monthly articles, which address 
different aspects of migration, displaced communities, refugees and stateless persons.  
Amal de Chikera, Head of Statelessness and Nationality Projects for Forced Migration 
Review wrote an article titled “Discrimination and Human Security of Stateless People, ” 
where she addresses what it means to have human insecurity as a stateless person. De 
Chikera et al. argue that, “from a human security perspective, the preoccupation of states 
with national security – seeing the irregular migration of vulnerable, often persecuted, 
people not in terms of their protection but in terms of border control – exacerbates and 
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entrenches the vulnerabilities of stateless persons”.44 Therefore, states have a right to all 
humans’ beings, especially the stateless, to be free from any discrimination that may 
produce human insecurity and thus, aid in the protection and rick of vulnerabilities due to 
their condition.  
However, Duncan Green, author of From Poverty to Power: How Active 
Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World, contends that “no one is free from 
risk,” but “the lives of most people are built around coping with risk—and all too 
frequently such risk turn into personal or societal catastrophe”.45  In other words, 
everyone is affected by poverty, vulnerability, everyday risks, disease, conflicts, and 
natural disasters— but some are at a higher risk than others. Nevertheless, stateless 
persons are the most susceptible to living in a state of vulnerability, thus, increasing the 
risk of human insecurity. This is why the transnational human rights issue of 
statelessness is a human security issue since it affects many helpless communities around 
the world and makes them even more vulnerable to globalized crimes, specifically 
human trafficking further addressed in this study. 
VI. Vulnerabilities Caused by Statelessness 
Statelessness has a significant impact on human security, access to advancement 
and enjoyment of human rights. When it comes to vulnerabilities caused by statelessness, 
due to a lack of protective rights, stateless persons are more exposed to situations where 
their legalities do not assist their situations. This may be because of the way that the 
country of reception may treat them, the way that their country of origin treats them or 
overall individual position. In Forced Migration Review, De Chikera et al emphasize 
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how a stateless person is especially vulnerable both to direct and indirect discrimination, 
meaning that they are placed at a disadvantage by a articular provision, criterion or 
practice which cannot be objectively justified.46 In these situations, stateless persons are 
deprived from civil and political rights, such as freedom of movement and the right to 
liberty and security of the person, and socio-economic rights, such as the right to an 
education and the right to livelihood.  
Consequently, stateless persons become part of the “minority” in their 
respective situations and are thus, treated as such— unfairly. The Special Rapporteur of 
the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities defines the term “minority” as “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the 
population, in a non-dominant position, [...] possessing distinct ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics and showing a sense of solidarity aimed at preserving those 
characteristics”47. In terms of stateless persons, they are categorized as part of the 
minority since they are alienated and marginalized. In the article “Human Trafficking 
and Minorities: Vulnerability Compounded by Discrimination”, Heidi Box mentions that 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities focuses on protecting minority groups’ culture and 
identity, but glosses over the myriad disadvantages that minorities face by virtue of group 
marginalization48. Subsequently, stateless persons suffer from being automatically placed 
in the highest state of vulnerability— human trafficking.49  
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As defined by the United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons 
(TIP) annual report, trafficking is: the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of fore or other forms of coercion, or 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.50” Box claims that “if 
we assume that susceptibility to trafficking is impacted and increased by powerful “push 
factors” like poverty, disenfranchisement, lack of education, and so on, then it follows 
that minority populations are likely to be prime targets for human traffickers”.51 Although 
membership in a minority group— such as stateless persons— may not be the primary 
reason for exploitation, it may increase vulnerability to heteronomous scenarios. Box 
illustrates this by giving an example of indigenous peoples in Peru, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay. Indigenous peoples are discriminated against in the work force and this 
prejudice is cited as the primary reason for income disparity between indigenous and 
non-indigenous peoples. 52  Furthermore, indigenous populations have historically 
experienced debt bondage in all three of these countries. This suggests that non-minority 
members likely exploit these marginalized groups after systemic inequality severely 
limits their job prospects and thus, these marginalized groups must seek alternative ways 
to sustain themselves.   
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Statelessness and human trafficking in conversation 
Box states very blatantly in her conclusion that “although there is suggestive of 
a link between disadvantaged populations and susceptibility to trafficking, this 
correlation has been insufficiently investigated. Indeed, it is surprising how little 
research has been done to explore human trafficking through the lens of minority 
discrimination”. This is mainly because “minority group membership” as described by 
Box, is often overlooked as part of criterion in anti-trafficking research. In terms of 
stateless persons, one reason they may be overlooked as minorities is due to their lack 
of ‘belonging’ to one specific group. Nevertheless, stateless persons are minorities 
within their situations who are discriminated and are highly susceptible to human 
trafficking.  
The Nexus Between Statelessness and Human Trafficking in Thailand is one of 
the most recent and empirically accurate studies ever done on this topic. This report 
focuses on the difference in experiences between stateless persons and citizens and their 
proneness to being trafficked. The group of experts in statelessness, human trafficking, 
gender studies and Subjective Legal Empowerment theory worked together to collect 
data through field study, in-depth interviews, surveys based on the experiences of 
members of hill tribes.53 As stated in The Hague Institute for Global Justice, this study 
was able to examine external and internal root causes (such as poverty, lack of education, 
or risk-taking behavior) that can expose an individual to a higher risk of trafficking.54 
The study began with two distinct hypotheses, including: 1.) Root causes of human 
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trafficking are more prevalent among stateless persons than citizens, prompting them to 
enter the trafficking chain at a higher rate and 2.) Stateless persons are less able to solve 
problems and (legal) disputes than citizens, exposing them to exploitation at a higher 
rate.55 Through their research, they were able to conclude that stateless persons may 
intrinsically be more likely to fall prey to trafficking because they seek a better life away 
from home at a higher rate than citizens. Furthermore, stateless persons may become 
exploited at a higher rate than citizens in the process of seeking a better life away from 
their country of origin.56 Therefore, what truly matters when trying to understand the 
connection between statelessness and human trafficking is the risk that stateless persons 
may have due to internal root causes that can expose them to human trafficking.  
VII. What is Not Fully Answered? 
Throughout history, statelessness has had a significant impact on the way that 
human rights have been addressed. This phenomenon has taken away basic human rights 
and marginalized stateless persons. Amal de Chikera emphasizes in Forced Migration 
that in the human rights field, there is a need for the impact of discrimination to be 
explored more fully by those approaching the issue of statelessness from a human 
security perspective. 57  Furthermore, it is imperative to explore the causes of 
discrimination of stateless persons that places them at a higher risk of human trafficking. 
One-way in which Ayten Gündogdu, author of Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: 
Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants attempts to address the 
situation through a human security perspective is by recognizing the lack of rightlessness 
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of stateless persons.58 According to Gündogdu, “Ardent’s notion of “rightlessness,” 
highlighting a fundamental condition that can undermine the very possibility of claiming 
and exercising even the rights that one formally has, draws attention to what gets lost in 
this conventional frame and renders statelessness more comparable to structural problems 
such as poverty, racial inequality, and patriarchy”.59 Consequently, this is problematic 
since the structural problem of statelessness is not being addressed but the affects of its 
structure.  
Gündogdu offers the example that instead of tackling patriarchy as a structural 
problem, activist for women’s rights focus on violence against women and highlight 
bodily harm in order to be able to assign responsibility for identifiable violations. 60 
Arendt’s analysis of the legal dimension of rightlessness draws attention to the tight 
connection that the nation-state institutional framework established between citizenship 
and legal personhood: “Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that 
no law exists for them”.61 Therefore, this is what has continued to create ambiguity when 
dealing with stateless persons, in terms of legality.  
Overall, due to the issue of institutional framework, it has becomes very 
difficult to place both statelessness and human trafficking in the same conversation. This 
is because they are both structural problems where only their consequences have been 
recognized or dealt with. Nevertheless, the Arenditian critique applies to this concept in 
that although the laws are insufficient in solving the problems of trafficking within 
statelessness there should remain a consistent insistency on personhood in order to 
understand the nexus between statelessness and human trafficking.  	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In order to understand the link between statelessness and human trafficking, my 
primary example will be the 2013 Dominican Republic Supreme Court ruling, which 
rendered Haitian-Dominicans stateless and their vulnerabilities to trafficking. In the 
following chapters, this thesis will address the following: Chapter 2 will focus on a 
historical account of the Dominican Republic and Haiti in order to understand their 
recent conflict. Chapter 3 will establish an in depth case study of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti issue of statelessness, and how de jure statelessness came about from 
Law 169-14. Lastly, Chapter 4 will focus on understanding vulnerabilities by addressing 
relatable recommendations of statelessness and trafficking from the Thailand report, as 
well as what organizations believe should be done to address the internal root causes of 

















CHAPTER TWO- HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC AND HAITI  
 
I. Introduction 
Just like the United States ratified the 14th Amendment to include African-
American as national citizens, in 2013 the Dominican Republic Constitutional Court 
ruling ratified the Dominican Constitution, which took away the nationality of several 
thousand Haitian-Dominican. This has caused an international protest for recognition of 
Haitian-Dominicans as stateless persons, whom are now deprived of the right to do 
things that other nationals have granted, such as getting a job, obtain an education, or 
even have access to health care. Following the definition of stateless persons under 
international law, Haitian-Dominicans whom were affected by the 2013 Court Ruling 
are considered to be de jure stateless “because during their lifetime they lost their own 
nationality and did not acquire a new one”.62  
Therefore, this chapter will focus on the issues of de jure Haitian-Dominicans in 
the Dominican Republic and how national legislation has addressed concerns of what it 
means to be a Dominican citizen. In order to understand the deportations and violence 
towards Haitian-Dominicans in the Dominican Republic, it is essential to understand the 
centuries of troubled history and contentious historical accounts between the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti.   
II. Conflict Since Hispaniola 
The conflict between the Dominican Republic and Haiti is based on white 
supremacy and race brought upon colonization. Taino Indians first occupied the island 
of Hispaniola found in the Caribbean up until the early 1600s when Christopher 
Columbus from Spain colonized the island. 63  Then, in 1697 France and Spain divided 
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the island of Hispaniola in two after battling for control.64 Francois-Dominique and 
Toussaint-Louverture conquered the Spanish side during the Haitian Revolution (1790-
1804) and Emperor Jean-Jacques Dessalines destroyed Santiago and the Cibao Valley in 
1805.65 However, in 1822, fearing further foreign intervention from the east, the newly 
unified Republic of Haiti occupied the even newer Dominican Republic, which had 
declared itself free from Spain just months before.66 
During this time, some suggested that Haiti was able to occupy the Dominican 
Republic because its previous colonizer—Spain— had never cared about the country’s 
well being.67 For instance, the British merchant James Franklin published some of his 
views in 1828 after making several business trips to the Republic of Haiti or San 
Domingo during the time that the Dominican Republic was annexed to Haiti. As 
Franklin published, “the indolence and inactivity inherent in the Spanish character have 
been displaced in all their colours in this part of San Domingo; for although their district 
possessed all the natural means required to raise them to an equal pitch of splendor with 
their French neighbors, yet so powerful were their propensities for pleasure, and every 
species of amusement, that they devoted but little of their time to the improvement of 
their properties, and they obtained from them but little beyond a scanty supply for their 
own immediate wants”.68 This is a relevant observation that offers another perspective to 
Dominican’s Republic continuous colonization demonstrating how weak the Dominican 
Republic was in comparison to San Domingo. However, this made it much easier for 
Haiti to occupy the Dominican Republic.  
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In addition, Haiti occupied the Dominican side for 22 years in an effort to free 
the entire island from slavery since there were many imported African slaves69. Slavery 
had become essential to the island as it became the most cherished commodity for its 
Spanish and French colonizers. As the mulatto priest, Antonio Sánchez Valverde 
describes in his work The Idea of Value in the Island of Espanola, “above all, the Slaves 
were the most useful and valuable commodity. Besides those slaves, there has been a 
continual influx of fugitive slaves from the French border, other slaves that the French 
have brought for sale; and other slaves that the Spanish have brought in exchange for 
livestock and cattle”. 70  
Unlike on other Caribbean islands, the Spanish invaders found that many natural 
resources had already been exhausted. Livestock became important in Santo Domingo 
and did not require much slave labor.71 At the same time, hundreds of thousands of 
enslaved Africans were imported to work the sugar cane plantations of Haiti. However, 
throughout Haitian occupation of the island, the goal was to replace slavery with a new 
valuable commodity to get rid of white supremacy. Consequently, during that time the 
Spanish speaking Dominicans were restricted to speaking French and Haitians enforced 
oppressive rules on labor and the redistribution of wealth.72 Thus, throughout the 
twenty-two years of Haitian occupation, Haitians were able to reduce slavery, but at a 
high price for Dominicans since some Dominicans viewed this period as a brutal 
military regime. 73 
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This difficult time for the Dominicans created cultural conflicts in language, 
race, religion and national tradition between the Dominicans and Haitians. In order to 
raise funds for the huge recompense of 150 million francs that Haiti agreed to pay the 
former French colonists, Haiti imposed heavy taxes on the Dominicans.74 It was in the 
city of Santo Domingo that the effects of the occupation were most strongly felt, and it 
was there that the movement for Dominican independence originated. This difficult 
time for the Dominicans created cultural conflicts in language, race, religion and 
national tradition between the Dominicans and Haitians. Many Dominicans developed 
a resentment of Haitians, who they saw as oppressors.75  
 
Although the occupation effectively reduced colonial slavery throughout the 
island, several resolutions and written dispositions were expressly aimed at converting 
average Dominicans into second-class citizens: restrictions of movement, prohibition 
to run for public office, night curfews, inability to travel in groups, banning of civilian 
organizations, and the indefinite closure of the state university (on the alleged grounds 
of its being a subversive organization) all led to the creation of movements advocating 
a forceful separation from Haiti with no compromises.76 At the movement’s center was 
La Trinitaria, a conspiracy named after Pablo Duarte, Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, 
and Ramon Mella. “Duarte, Sanchez y Mella” launched the Dominican war for 
independence with an assault on the iconic Conde Gate in the city walls and the Ozama 
Fortress, the oldest structure in Santo Domingo.77 La Trinitaria continues to be 
commemorated at Independence Park near the Conde Gate with the Altar of the 	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Fatherland, which contains the tombs and larger-than-life statues. The Dominican 
Republic gained its independence from Haiti on February 27, 1844 and its thought that 
this period of occupation was where their relationship began to deteriorate.  
Migration from Haiti to the Dominican Republic began first at the border and 
spread throughout the country around the 1870s. 78   The Haitian government 
encouraged peasants to immigrate into the Dominican Republic because of the land 
scarcity in Haiti.79 In 1899 the Haitian government claimed the center-west and the 
southwest of the Dominican Republic, including western Lake Enriquillo, as it 
estimated that Haitians had become the majority in that area.80 The arrival of Haitians 
to the rest of the country began after the United States occupied both Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic around 1916, when US-owned sugar companies imported 
annually, thousands of Haitian workers to cut costs. 81 
 
In 1930, dictator Rafael Trujillo established himself as a candidate when a 
provisional government had been established after the Dominican President Horacio 
Vasquez faced revolts and he remained president for the next 31 years until his 
assassination. He is relevant to the current Haitian-Dominican stateless issue since 
Trujillo’s policies are still in the minds of many who lived during his dictatorship, and 
have negatively affected migration policies today.  During Trujillo's campaign, he 
organized a secret police force to torture and murder supporters of the opposing 
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candidate.82 His corruption only continued when shortly into Trujillo's first term, the 
country’s capital—Santo Domingo—was devastated by a hurricane.83 Trujillo used the 
disaster as an excuse to impose martial law on all citizens, as well as imposed 
"emergency taxes".84 During his additional years in office, Trujillo continued to use his 
power for personal profit as he took total control of all major industries and financial 
institutions.85 The country saw some improvements to its economy mainly limited to 
the capital city, meanwhile in more rural areas, entire peasant communities were 
uprooted to clear the way for Trujillo’s new sugar plantation.86 
 
In 1936, Haiti received several of villages located in La Miel valley after a 
revision of the borderline.87  However, dictator Rafael Trujillo was extremely opposed 
to giving away territory and to also having Haitians migrate into the Dominican 
Republic.88 Between 1935 and 1937 the Trujillo imposed restrictions on foreign labor 
and ordered the deportation of Haitians in the border area, but these measures failed 
due to a corruption scheme involving Dominican military men, civil authorities, and 
US-owned sugar companies, and the trafficking of undocumented Haitian 
immigrants.89 He developed Antihaitinismo (“anti-Haitianism”), a uniquely Dominican 
policy of racial discrimination targeting the mostly-black inhabitants of his 
neighboring country and those within the border, including many Afro-Dominican 
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citizens.90 Conversely, Trujillo was known for his open-door policy, accepting Jewish 
refugees from Europe, Japanese migration during the 1930s, and exiles from Spain 
following its civil war.91 At the 1938 Evian Conference—an international conference 
to promote the emigration of Austrian and German Jewish refugees— the Dominican 
Republic was the only country willing to accept many Jews and offered to accept up to 
100,000 refugees on generous terms. 92  The first settlers arrived in May 1940; 
eventually some 800 settlers came to Sosua and most moved later on to the United 
States.93 Refugees from Europe broadened the Dominican Republic’s tax base and 
added more whites to the predominantly mixed-race nation.94As such, Trujillo’s 
approach was to cleanse the population by adding more “whiteness” and evading 
Haitian migrants into the Dominican Republic.  
III. Trujillo’s 1937 Parsley Massacre 
Trujillo was known to treat the Dominican Republic's Haitian migrants with 
particular severity and a deliberate disregard for their civil liberties.95 In 1937, he went 
as far as to orchestrate the massacre of thousands of Haitian immigrants. Trujillo was 
obsessed with pale skin, and under his rule he persecuted dark skinned Haitians living 
in Dominican border towns.96 Trujillo unleashed a genocidal assault known as the 
Haitian Massacre, which killed approximately 15,000 ethnic Haitians, mainly in the 
northwest border region. Known as La Masacre del Perejil in Spanish, Trujillo 
claimed that Haiti was harboring his former Dominican opponents and as such, Trujillo 
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ordered an attack on the border targeting Haitians as they tried to escape. 97Most of 
them were murdered by Dominican army troops, using machetes to make it look as 
though civilian peasants had perpetrated the slaughter. 98 
The Haitian Massacre compiled by Eric Roorda, Lauren Derby, and Reymundo 
Gonzalez focuses on several accounts of eyewitness’s 50 years after the massacre.99 
Fifty years after the bloodshed, the historians Lauren Derby and Richard Turits 
interviewed survivors living in Haiti, some still residing in towns that had begun as 
refugee communities set up by the Haitian government, and recorded forty hours of 
these survivors’ grim recollections in Kreyol mixed with Spanish.100 One town where 
Derby and Turits located eyewitnesses to the genocide was Ounaminthe, located on the 
Massacre River across from Dajabon, Dominican Republic, the epicenter of the 
disaster.101  
Irelina Pierre, from Dosmond/Ouanaminthe: 
“I was born in the Dominican Republic. When the massacre broke out, I was 
very small. I remember that I had been in school a while. The day of my 
brother’s marriage, after the ceremony was over, a Dominican arrived at the 
reception. The reception was the morning that the massacre broke out, and 
people started fleeing. That night we hid. The next morning when we woke up, 
some of the older people said, “Be careful if you go out.” So we stayed at home. 
Everyone came to my grandparent’s house. They said they were going to Haiti 
because a revolution had broke out, and that they were killing Haitians. They all 
slept at my grandparent’s. During the night, a woman said to me, “You come 
with me to my here. So we went to the garden where my mother was working, 
and she cut some bananas and put them in her bag. I carried a tree branch. 
Suddenly, I looked over and saw a lot of guardias [Dominican soldiers] getting 
off their horses, and I heard them say, “There’s one over there in the garden.” 
Then they entered the garden and killed the girl…. When I arrived here, I didn’t 	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have any family to receive me so I went back to Cap again. I stayed under the 
auspices of the state. After about a year, they sent me back to Ouanaminthe 
again, at which time I lived there with some other foreigners. God gave me the 
strength to survive. Now I am married and have four children, but my entire 
family died during the massacre. Both my mother and father were born in the 
Dominican Republic. We lived in Loma de Cabrera. My father worked in 
agriculture, growing manioc, peanuts, rice on his own land— land that he 
bought. He had ten-karo land (32.5 acress). He also kept some cattle, pigs, 
chickens, and goats. We grew enough food to feed the family (we neer bought 
food at market) but also to sell. I used to go to market with my mother where we 
sold everything— peas, rice, bananas, and corn. I only spoke in Kreyol since we 
lived among Haitians. I hardly spoke in Spanish at all. There were some 
Dominicas in the area where we lived, but not many; there were mostly Haitians. 
There were both marriages between Haitians and Dominicans, as well as 
concubine. There were no problems that I remember between Haitians and 
Dominicans— for example, no jealousy for Haitian land”.102 
Through this eyewitness account it is evident that although some Dominicans 
believed in Antihaitinismo, others were conscious of the wrong doings of Trujillo’s 
government. The Haitian response was muted, but its government eventually called for 
an international investigation. Under pressure from Washington, Trujillo agreed to a 
reparation settlement in January 1938 that involved the payment of US$750,000.103 By 
the next year, the amount had been reduced to US$525,000 (US$ 8,641,840.28 in 
2016); 30 dollars per victim, of which only 2 cents were given to survivors, due to 
corruption in the Haitian bureaucracy.104 In 1941, Lescot, who had received financial 
support from Trujillo, succeeded Vincent as President of Haiti.105 Trujillo expected 
Lescot to be a puppet, but Lescot turned against him. Trujillo unsuccessfully tried to 
assassinate him in a 1944 plot, and then published their correspondence and discredited 
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him 106 . Lescot was then exiled after a 1946 palace coup before Trujillo was 
assassinated in 1961.107 
With modernization from the 1960s on, fewer workers were required, and other 
Dominican industries and services started employing more Haitian workers, often an 
inexpensive, less regulated labor source with fewer legal protections108. Economically, 
the Dominican Republic fairs better than Haiti.109 Experts suggest that this disparity is 
due to the way Hispaniola is divided. While the Dominican Republic enjoys plentiful 
rains, the mountains that border the two nations cut off Haiti’s rainfall.110 The semi 
arid climate coupled with deforestation problem has made Haiti’s agricultural 
production more restrictive than in the Dominican Republic.111 Many Haitian women 
find work in Dominican households, and Haitian men at Dominican construction sites, 
often leading to the move of an entire family.  
Trujillo's policies served to establish the perpetuation of Antihaitinismo within 
the Dominican Republic 112. During the 1996 Dominican presidential election, Joaquin 
Balaguer, (historical leader of the populist Right and former right-hand of dictator 
Trujillo) united in a “National Patriotic Front” with then candidate Leonel Fernandez 
in order to prevent Pena Gomez from becoming President.113 Today tensions are 
largely motivated by racism. Human rights experts observe that Dominicans openly 
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discriminate against Haitians because they perceive them to be blacker— despite both 
cultures having African ancestry.114 Dominicans argue that they have more European 
heritage than their next-door neighbor. Regardless, of the culmination of volatile 
incidents, comparative economic disparity and opposing perspectives on European 
influences, Haitian and Dominican relations are currently the worst they have been in 
75 years.115 
 
IV. 2013 Constitutional Court Ruling 
The divergence between the level of economic development between Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic, in addition to Antihaitinismo, has complicated the lives of 
Haitian-Dominicans born in the Dominican Republic. When the 2010 earthquake 
devastated Haiti, the Dominican Republic was quick to jump to its aid providing food, 
water, and rescue workers. 116  However, after the earthquake there was a mass 
migration of Haitians who took refuge to the Dominican Republic. A 2013 Supreme 
Court ruling retroactive to 1930, has declared that refugees can only be granted 
Dominican citizenship if at least one parent is a legal resident.117 According to the 
Human Rights Watch “We Are Dominican” report, Celso Perez mentions that more 
than 250,000 Haitian-Dominicans are considered stateless118. Most of these stateless 
people are people of Haitian descent who were born in the Dominican Republic. The 
UNHCR article, “Dominican Republic urged not to deport stateless Dominicans” 
points out that “for decades, the Dominican Republic recognized the children of 
Haitian migrants born in the country as Dominican citizens irrespective of the 	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migration status of their parents”119.  
 
Furthermore, Perez cites the Dominican Constitution, in which everyone born 
in the country between 1929 and 2010 was a Dominican national or citizen, with the 
expectation of those who parents were “in transit.”120 Until, recently Dominican 
nationality law did not clearly define who was “in transit”, or whether the term applied 
to undocumented migrants resident in the country.121 In practice, the government 
applied nationality law inconsistently since many undocumented migrants successfully 
register children born in the Dominican Republic as Dominican nationals, while others 
parents either failed to register their children, or were prevented from doing so by 
government officials122.  
Nevertheless, The UNHCR article, “Dominican Republic urged not to deport 
stateless Dominicans,” points out that the Court's ruling, along with previous changes 
to nationality laws aimed at tackling illegal migration from neighboring Haiti, ended 
this and a subsequent regularization plan gave them until mid-June to regularize their 
status.123 In a 2013 news story Reuters reported, "the September 23 court ruling 
retroactively denies Dominican nationality to anyone born after 1929 who does not 
have at least one parent of Dominican blood or legal resident of The Dominican 
Republic, under a constitutional clause declaring all others to be either in the country 
illegally or "in transit."124 At the same time, every child born to a Haitian father or 
mother, no matter where he or she was born, is Haitian by the Haitian Constitution. 	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This has been a big issue in the current Dominican nationality law; because of this and 
other factors, illegal migrants' children born in the Dominican Republic of Haitian 
origin are considered non-Dominicans, and therefore Haitians.125 Nevertheless, there 
are many issues with deporting Haitian- Dominicans back to Haiti starting with Haiti’s 
lack of resources. 
The two governments— the Dominican Republic and Haiti— have not been 
able to agree upon a legal framework to address the nationality of these descendants. 
According to the Latin American newspaper, Telesur, “Haiti and Dominican Republic 
Agree to Normalize Bilateral Relations,” tensions between the two Caribbean nations 
reached a peak in September 2013, when the Dominican Constitutional Tribunal ruled 
that descendants of undocumented foreign nationals were ineligible for Dominican 
nationality.126 Haiti responded with sanctions towards commercial trade agreements 
between the two countries, which would result in millions of lost revenue for the 
Dominican Republic.127 
V. The Dominican Republic’s Response 
De jure and de facto statelessness cases have been caused by deprivation of 
nationality, political persecution, mass emigration, territorial resettlement, and lastly 
what this chapter focuses on— inadequacy and conflict of national legislations 
concerning nationality. Although many of these cases remain unsolved, there are some 
that have addressed particular solutions to aid the marginalized stateless. For instance, in 
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efforts of getting returning deportees to obtain citizenship, Ukraine adopted a new law 
on citizenship that has helped reintegrate the survivors and descendants of 250,000 
Crimean Tartars who were rounded up by Stalin in 1944 and deported to Central Asia. 
128 Since 2002, this new law has resulted in more than 300,000 Crimean Tartans to 
return home and receive Ukrainian citizenship. 129 This is an important example because 
most countries like Ukraine, follow the principle of Jus Sanguinis— when citizenship is 
given by birth to a parent who is already a citizen of that country or by naturalization, 
and still statelessness occurs.  
Consequently researches such as Charline Becker, contributor to the European 
Network on Statelessness and member of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee believes 
that Jus Soli— birth right nationality— could be a solution to prevent statelessness. 130 
As Becker points out, “Jus Soli has been hardly used in most European countries for 
centuries, but in recent decades, an increasing number of European states have 
introduced limited and/ or conditional Jus Soli provisions in their law”. 131 This is due to 
the promising achievements of countries in the Americans that have included limited Jus 
Soli provisions in their nationality laws, including where children would otherwise be 
born stateless 132. In addition, these dispositions facilitate the inclusion of migrants’ 
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children, and taken together are important step towards the eradication of statelessness in 
countries where Jus Sanguinis is practiced.  
However, many countries have also utilized Jus Soli to constitutionally 
marginalize certain groups of people. For example, the concept of Jus Soli has a storied 
history in countries like the United States that dates back to the late 1800s. 133 As 
described in the National Public Radio article, “3 Things You Should Know About 
Birthright Citizenship in the United States,” the issue of citizenship was brought into 
focus by a Supreme Court ruling in 1857 that essentially declared that blacks— even the 
daughters and sons of freed slaves— were not US citizens. 134 Nonetheless, in 1868 the 
United States ratified the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The first 
sentence reads: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state in where they reside”. 
135 That language made it clears the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Dred Scott case was 
overturned and that black Americans would enjoy United States citizenship.136 This 
demonstrates that although Jus Soli does ensure citizenship for some, it also has the 
power to exclude others. As the 14th Amendment continued to be questioned about its 
specifics, it also helped in clarifying points that apply today. According to the rectified 
14th Amendment, United States born children of undocumented immigrants are 
automatically citizens of the United States, a concept that continues to be attacked by 
anti-immigration reformers.  
As National Public Radio discusses, there continue to be politicians and 
lawmakers who utilize Jus Soli as a way to target specific groups of people. Becker 	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points out “the limitations of jus soli provisions alone (in isolation) are evident in the 
fact that several thousands of persons born in the Americas still find themselves in a 
precarious legal situation, without an established nationality”. 137  The best known 
example of a de jure statelessness situation in the Americas is of course the tragic 
condition of Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic, where the 
government is using the “exception” in jus soli law (applicable to children of transiting 
migrants) to arbitrarily and illegally deprive several thousands of Dominican nationals of 
their nationality. As such, several scholars and international human rights organizations 
consider this an unconcealed example of an intentionally created, discrimination-based 
statelessness situation.138 
Consequently, in 2014 President Danilo Medina’s administration attempted to 
mitigate the high court ruling with a naturalization law 169-14 aimed at recognizing 
the citizenship claims of those affected by the 2013 decision.139 The naturalization law 
helped to provide undocumented immigrants with the opportunity to register with the 
immigration authorities. The 2014 Naturalization Law offered a seemingly simple 
solution: the government would recognize the nationality of those already registered 
with the state as Dominicans, and issue any additional documents necessary to fully 
exercise their citizenship rights. For those not yet registered, the government would 
first establish a registration process, then issue the requisite documents from those 
entitled to citizenship. However, despite a promising legal framework, Celso Perez’s 
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Human Rights Watch research finds that the law has been fraught with design and 
implementation flaws that have thwarted the re-naturalization process 140 . The 
registration process allowed 50,000 of Haitian immigrants to remain in the country, but 
the majority was unable to finish the process in time, as documents were slow to arrive 
from Haiti and crowds overwhelmed Dominican registration offices141.  
 As the issue continues to persist, there has not been much international aid in 
pushing the Dominican Republic to assist the stateless persons. Both the Supreme 
Court law of 2013 and the 2014 Naturalization Law have effectively left people whom 
were born in the Dominican Republic stateless, restricting their access to health care, 
education and employment opportunities. In addition, Haitian- Dominican tensions 
have escalated into violence with reports of Dominicans burning the Haitian flags and 
open calls for the deportation of all Haitian refugees. As UNHCR spokesperson Adrian 
Edward told a press briefing in Geneva, "With a stateless population in the Dominican 
Republic estimated at more than 200,000 people, the consequences of expulsion could 
be devastating," UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards told a press briefing in 
Geneva.142 Some citizens affected by the ruling have no connection to Haiti at all. The 
citizens in jeopardy of losing citizenship rights will have severe restrictions on 
education, employment, legal marriage and birth registration. According to the 
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National Institute for Latino Policy, leaving the country also presents challenges 
because they will not be able to obtain or renew passports. 143 
Understanding current Haitian-Dominican relations is nearly impossible unless 
the contentious historical accounts are analyzed. The practice of denationalization and 
deportation is a continuation of the legacy of anti-black racism in the Dominican 
Republic and has also resulted in placing these de jure stateless persons in higher risk 
of becoming vulnerable to human smuggling and trafficking. In the next chapter, I will 
address how according to the 2015 Human Trafficking Persons Report, there has been 
a target for persons who are smuggled and trafficked from Haiti into the Dominican 
Republic as illegal immigrants. In addition, I will focus on how the government’s 
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CHAPTER THREE-LAW169-14 AND ITS VULNERABILITES 
 
I. Introduction 
The issue of apatriados or stateless persons in the Dominican Republic became more 
apparent after 2014, when the Law 169-14—created to address statelessness— began causing 
more problems. On May 23, 2014 Law 169-14 was passed which sought to compensate for 
the damage caused by the judgment of the Tribunal Constitucional Dominicano or 
Constitutional Court Law 168-13, which targetted Dominican children of foreign parents.144 
In the Dominican Republic, this mostly concerned Dominicans of Haitian descent. Law 169-
14 immediately ordered a process to return and deliver identity documents for those whom 
were affected by the ruling. Law 169-14—a result of a political agreement— reflected a broad 
consesus between different sectors and interests in the society and was also recognized as an 
emergency by Congress.145 It was issued with good intentions to leave the heightened crisis 
due to sentencing No. 168-13.  
Although law-169-14 was created to help persons from becoming stateless, the several 
obstacles to regain and apply for citizenship have only created more vulnerability for stateless 
persons in the Dominican Republic. In order to understand the vulnerabilities of the Haitian-
Dominicans, it is essential to understand the process being categorized into a specific group 
according to the said standard, being identified as a stateless person, and most importantly, 
and the process of being recognized as citizens of the Dominican Republic.  
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II. Law 169-14: Categories of Groups  
  Law 169-14 categorized two groups who were affected by the judment of law 168-13, 
specifically to all Dominicans of Haitian descent born in Dominican territory to Haitian 
parents from 1929 to 2010.146 They are categorized into group A: consisting of Dominicans of 
Haitian descent who were recorded in the Dominican civil registry but were suspended and 
administratively seized by the Junta Central Electoral or the Central Electoral Board.147 
Meanwhile Group B is composed of Dominicans of Haitian descent whom were not recorded 
in Dominican civil registry. 148 
For Group A, the law 169-14 ordered for the Central Electoral Board (JCE) to deliver and 
return identity documents (birth certificates and identity cards) without administrative process 
to those whom were affected by law 168- 13.149 Nevertheless, for Group B, law 169-14 left an 
unknown process for two years to attempt entry into a special naturalization process.150 
However, unlike Group A, it was not until July 2014 that Group B was given information 
about how the naturalization process works, thus making Group B more vulnerable to 
statelessness.  
III. Law 169-14:Group A 
An essential element of the law 169-14 is the immediate restitution of the documentation 
of all those people who already had papers (Group A).151 However, the Central Electoral 
Board has interpreted the execution of Law 169-14 in their own way. The Central Electoral 
Board has opted for the mandate of the Constitutional Court ruling 168-13, which allows for 
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the board to conduct an audit from 1929 to 2010 within a period of one year.152 Although the 
Central Electoral Board requires the prompt return of identity documents, it takes advantage 
of the 169-14 law, since there is no fixed period of time for delivery of documents to Group 
A.153  
The Central Electoral Board has acted in a way that reveals a lack of interest and 
commitment to honor the political agreement. The JCE has also established the ongoing 
bureaucratic process and created specific obstacles for Group A to acquire their citizen 
documentation. Among the main obstacles to the implementation of the law 169-14 are the 
following: 
I. Delaying documents: Central Electoral Board delaying delivery of documents is 
unjustifiable since an audit is not required by law to be carried out154. Bureaucracy, and delay 
slows the process and the release of the necessary documents. In addition, there is a lack of 
information, accountability and transparency from the JCE due to the audit process which 
utlizes terms like "transcribed", "regularized", "Transcribed and regularized" that are not 
clearly explained to the public. 155  Furthermore, through the the so-called audit, the 
beneficiaries of the law 169-14 are subjected to an interview-inspection, as if the people 
affected by the judgment 168-13  were at fault for their situation.156 Group A beneficiaries are 
indeed victims since they are not at fault for becoming de jure stateless— since they were 
once part recognized by their state and now they are not. 
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II. The Central Electoral Board does not take into consideration material and financial 
obstacles to access the civil registration157. This is an issue because some are asked to find 
paperwork that no longer exists or to pay for auditors to process their paperwork even if they 
do not have the funds to do so. 
III. The Central Electoral Board violates the data protection of the individual in Group A. 
This is shown by the creation of a civil registration book called the "Libro de 
Transcripsiones" or Book of Transcriptions without legal basis where all people all stateless 
people of Haitian descent are registered, appearing as "transcript and regularized".158 
IIII. The Central Electoral Board continues to make annulment demands of the original 
birth acts of those affected.159 This is because people affected with claims of invalidity live in 
conditions of extreme vulnerability and poverty, so they cannot afford to defend themselves in 
the bureaucratic Dominican justice system.  
V. Difficulty of Dominicans of Haitian descent for the renewal of the identity card and 
voter. During the process of renewal of identity cards, launched by the JCE in 2014, 
Dominicans of Haitian descent, despite having valid documents and reviewed by the JCE, 
were subjected to additional checks and requirements with additional data and documents 
delayed or prevented from the effective restoration of their identity cards.160 This has affected 
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Group A: Effects of non-compliance with law 169-14: Racial discrimination towards 
Dominicans of Haitian descent in Group A 
Non-compliance with the law 169-14 also manifestests forms of racial discriminanion 
against Dominicans of Haitian descent. In the case of Group A this becomes visible in the 
following situations: Denial of the right to the Civil Registry: taking the mother and father and 
electoral Dominican identity card, denies the civil registration of their children as 
Dominicans.161 In addition, denial of White Certificates in Hospitals has also become a 
problem. Dominican parents of Haitian descent without identity card in the hospitals do not 
give them a certified childbirth but treat them like foreigners (Haitians).162 The representatives 
of hospitals assume functions do not corresponded to them, and they are discriminated against 
their skin color and "Haitian" appearance. Newborns are credited with Haitian origin by their 
grandparents.163 
 Furthermore, deportation of stateless and Dominican racial phenotypic profile (racial 
profiling) for looking “Haitian” has escaleted in the past two years. Some of the most recent 
examples of deportation include: 
Fifty three people, thirty of them  children along with their parents, two nuns and an 
advocate of Human Rights Jesuit Network with Migrants were deported to Haiti on January 
27, 2015. 164 This group was headed to San Juan de la Maguana to apply for the naturalization 
process but were deported by Elias Pina instead. Another case occurred  just a few days after 
on January 31st, when 32 children of Jimani heading to Barahona to apply for naturalization 
were arrested and taken away by immigration officials of Jimani to be deported to Haiti. 165 
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In addition, there have been several instances of physical and verbal attacks against  
individuals part of Group A. On March 2015, two members of Dominican Recognized 
Movement were attacked by passengers and a bus driver saying that Feliz and Polo did not 
have their identity cards and they looked  like" Haitians," according to statements by Estefany 
Feliz.166 Mr. Lidio Polo and Estefany Feliz were physically assaulted at a bus stop in 
Barahona, Dominican Republic. The driver spat at Lidio Polo, hit him, and then four or five 
people also began to attack both people. 167 One of the attackers hit Lidio Polo with a stone, 
inflicting a wound.The driver then pushed Estefany Feliz, who fell and injured her back.“We 
saw death" they said. "Due to our color, we are worthless," said Lidio Polo.168 This is an 
example of a hate-crime act, where individuals of Group A had their lives threatened, even 
when they had their identity cards. This incident was largely publicized in the Dominican 
Republic because Feliz and Polo are well-known human rights activitsts, but incidents like 
these occur on a daily basis and are not addressed by the authorities.  
 
IV. Interview with Michelle Fadeus 
Having the opportunity to read people’s personal accounts regarding the Haitian-
Dominican stateless sometimes makes it more believeable as it shows how they are truly 
affected by it. As a Dominican living in the United States, I began hearing about Haitian-
Dominicans becoming stateless due to the Supreme Court ruling in 2013. However, it 
was not until 2014 when people started getting deported that I saw it as “threat”. 
Ironically, the first person that I thought about asking about this issue was Michelle 
Fadeus, a family friend whom I knew since childhood. After asking him more questions, 	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he let me know that he was categorized as part of Group A since he was once registered 
in the Dominican civil registry. Later on this past summer, I had the opportunity to 
conduct a more formal interview with him to learn more about his process and how his 
life has been impacted by these laws. The following interview was conducted in Santiago, 
Dominican Republic on August 26, 2015.  
Interview: 
Anabel: “What is your name?” 
Michelle: “Michelle Fadeus” 
Anabel: “Where were you born?” 
Michelle: “I was born in a small town in the Dominican Republic” 
Anabel: “How old are you?” 
Michelle: “I am 28 years old” 
Anabel: “How do you identify yourself, whether it be race, ethnicity or nationality? For 
example, my ethnicity is Dominican and my race is Spaniard and African due to my 
ancestors” 
Michelle: “ I identify my self as Dominican as well, however my parents are both 
Haitian, but my grandmother from my mother’s side is Cuban ”. 
Anabel: “Oh wow, I had no idea!” 
Michelle: “Yea” 
Anabel: “Do you have family in Haiti?” 
Michelle: “Yes, I do. My father still lives in Haiti and most of my family actually lives 
in Haiti” 
Anabel: “What are you applying for specifically?” 
Michelle: “I am applying for my citizenship since it was taken away” 
Anabel: “Would you mind explaining further how and why?” 
Michelle: “Well, I was born here and I had my cedula (certification card)”  
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Anabel: “How was the process of applying to receive your cedula? 
Michelle: “Actually, I have not received my official card since it has been a year-long 
process, with extreme bureaucracy, long days of going to the Junta Central Electoral, 
gathering all of my documents— some from my Haitian parents— and missing work 
as well” 
Anabel: “What has been the most difficult part of this process?” 
Michelle: “I think that since my daughter was born and she is also Dominican— as 
well as her mother— also trying to figure out her paper work since she was born two 
years ago and no one who was born past 2007 is allowed to apply for citizenship” 
Anabel: “But how is that possible since she was born here, and the hospital has her 
birth certificate and paper work?” 
Michelle: “Because the certain hospitals are identifying children of parents without 
citizenship as Haitians. However, since the mother is entirely Dominican we are 
utilizing that to help us prove that she is indeed a Dominican citizen.” 
Anabel: “In your opinion, do you believe that the law 168-14 is actually helping people 
regain their citizenship?” 
Michelle: “ Not necessarily. I’ve lived here all of my life, my life is the Dominican 
Republic. I thought that I was already a citizen and then now I have to go through so 
many obstacles to regain what I was born with. No tiene sentido (It does not make 
sense). I also know that there are so many racist people against me, who simply make 
the process much more difficult than it needs to be.” 
Anabel: “Would you ever consider living in Haiti since most of your family lives 
there?” 
Michelle: “Not really, only to visit since I always do, but this is my home and where I 
want my child to grow up”. 
Anabel: “Do you feel safe in the Dominican Republic?” 
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Michelle: “Regardless of what is going on and all of the ongoing discrimination, I do 
feel safe. I guess it’s all I’ve known.” 
 After listening to his answers, translated from Spanish into English, I noticed how 
every word was sincere. His words conveyed his confusion with trying to identify himself 
as Haitian or Dominican, or even Cuban. He did not need that as long as he was a citizen 
of the country he was born— that was all that seemed to mater to him.  
 
Has there been any progress for Group A? 
Two years after the law 169-14, delivering documentation for Dominicans of Haitian 
descent has continued to fail. The JCE has failed to fulfill the mandate of this law as it 
only continues the bureaucratic path and administrative processes to outlaw beneficiarias 
to resort to the same slow processes and economic cost that they can not afford. The few 
electoral identity cards that have been obtained have difficulties when appearing in the 
system. From a load of  over 900 cases that have been  monitored from the 
implementation of the law, less than 500 have managed to have their documentation and 
those who have received it, a large majority has limited use for their documentation as 
they cannot exercise their civil and political rights.169 
 
V.Law 169-14: Group B 
During my time in the Dominican Republic, I contacted a non-profit organization 
called Centro de Formación y Acción Social y Agraria (CEFASA). As stated in their 
website, “CEFASA, whose acronym stands for Center for Agricultural Training and 
Social Action is a nonprofit institution founded by the Jesuits in 1963.” 170 It is also 
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funded by international organizations. 171In 2014, CEFASA adopted its current strategic 
plan, covering the years 2014 to 2019, where defined as lines of action: “the protection 
and defense of human rights, training and strengthening of people and social 
organizations, the establishment of inter-agency partnerships and joint national and 
international networks, promoting livelihood development sustainable and institutional 
strengthening”.172 As such, they have been an integral part in the process of pro-bono 
naturalization work with an array of services from lawyers, auditors and accountants.  
 
During my time at CEFASA, I wrote my experiences, observations, stories and 
thoughts to be able to apply them in understanding the affects of Law 169-14 on 
vulnerable populations. 
Journal Entry 4  
August 13, 2015 
 As part of my pasantia or volunteership, I mostly helped with organizing the legal 
documents for the naturalization process, and helped the clients learn more about their 
individual cases. As I begun learning more about Law 169-14, I asked who exactly was 
coming to get help with their paper work. As my supervisor, Yvonne had mentioned, it 
was mostly Group B people who were coming to acquire help from the organization as 
they had become the most vulnerable group to apatradia. The first day Yvonne 
mentioned how the governemnt had to do something about the law that stripped 
citizenship away because many business men would lose workers. However, she pointed 
out that there is no way as of yet to have people that do not have money stay because the 
process is very bureacratic and expensive. At the time I did not know exaclty what the 
difference between Group A and Group B was since they were both taken their 
citizenship away, but as I later learned Group B was the group that was never even 	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recognized as citizens. It made me question, was it worse to lose something you never 
really had or have something taken away? In both situations, I learned that both groups 
suffered challenges to one day acquire citizenship. 
Grupo B:  
Group B established by law 169-14, refers to Dominicans of Haitian descent who for 
some reason could not be registered in the civil registry and this law established a 
registration process for naturalization in two years.173The Law 169-14 had the objective 
to solve the problem of lack of documentation and reduce the risks for statelessness since 
the state is obliged to prevent.174 
For Group B, Law 169-14, foresaw the need to issue a regulation to provide evidence 
of birth in the country. As the first phase, they were offered to register within 90 days as 
foreigners to obtain birth certificate, then acquire legal immigration status through 
immigration card (2nd. stage), with the option to choose (2 years later) for Dominican 
nationality through the ordinary naturalization ( 3rd. phase). 175 
The regulation also requires applicants to provide evidence to prove they were born 
in the Dominican Republic, such as birth certificate in public or private hospital; act of 
notoriety, 7 witnesses; affidavits; testimonial and Dominican family who have Dominican 
national documentation. 176  Once the instruction of the administrative procedure is 
completed, there is aperiod of 30 days to decide on the application, either accepting or 
rejecting it.177 Applications are accepted depending on the Central Electoral Board.  
Obstacles to implementation of the law 169-14 for Group B 	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Since the beginning of implementation of the law 169-14, the platform 169-14 and 
Dominican @ sX law have pointed to the obstacles identified in the first months of the 
implementation of the law.178 Subsequently, the report on the situation of Human Rights 
2014 by the Jesuit Network of Social Centers , built by the Bono Center, CEFASA and 
Border Solidarity, emphasized other anomalies in the process. 179 Finally, in February 
2015, the platform Dominican @ sX explained the limited impact of the Law 169-14, 
pointing obstacles identified at the end of the registration deadline. 180All obstacles 
registered in the documents cited, are exposed as followed: 
 
I.Lack of information 
II.Territorial exclusion, meaning that it was verified that  not enough offices enable all 
persons regardless of their residence could enter the process in terms of mobility and 
distances.181 They emphasized the exclusion of the border zone in this process, where the 
vast part of the population affected is concentrated. 
III. Offices not opened 
Some provincial offices refused to receive applications from residents of other provinces 
in the same region. This policy exclude the possibility of recourse to the law to persons 
residing in provinces where official opened, or where opened very late at the end of the 
process.182 
IV. Requirement for additional documents. The Ministry of Interior and Police (MIP) 
adopted the administrative decision to require some identity of the mother of Group B, in 	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ordr to process applications.183 This requirement is not required in any part of the Act or 
Decree 250-14and has been a major obstacle for people to benefit from the law. In cases 
of people if they have the birth certificate of the mother, they are not accepted if the 
document was not legalized and translated into Spanish, and in some cases, had to be 
certified in Haiti.184 
V. People in  Group B have been listed on the National Plan for the Regularization of 
Foreigners (PNRE). 185There are reports that in some Units MIP sent people born in the 
country to benefit from the regularization plan and not the naturalization process, which 
many people who do not know about the Law acepted and losing the the ability to one 
day claim back the right to their citizenship. 
VI. No applications from people born after April 19, 2007 are received because the MIP 
has ordered although this requirement is not in the 250-14 or 169-14 Decree Law.186 
VII. increase rate: an increase of 100% in the price of services of the Attorney 
legalization, coinciding with the time of application of the law that it is for a large 
population of the Act, which falls to a wide population is found scarce resources. The 
Office of the Attorney General rates climbed RD $ 300 to RD $ 600 pesos.187 From $6.50 
to $13.00 in dollars. This was actually a very common thing that I noticed when interning 
at CEFASA. Many people from Group B did not have money to pay for the attorney 
legalization and they would call their pro-bono lawyer, who might have or might not have 
been there depending on the day. Then, they would have had to travel back to and wait 
for their turn to be called back.  	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Journal 8 
August 27, 2015 
I’ve heard stories about the women who would come to help gather their papers, one who 
was pregnant and really wanted her process to be quick before her child was born. I also 
heard about an old Haitian-Dominican man who would come once a week to check on the 
status of his paperwork, although he lived more than 7 hours away. One day on his way 
to CEFASA he came on a motorcycle to give the last few of his papers that had been 
delivered all the way from Haiti. Unfortunately, some guy thinking that his purse had 
money, stole the purse and he lost all of his documents. As a few of my coworkers told 
me, he arrived to CEFASA crying with no hope in his eyes. That day I realized how the 
system that I was trying to understand was only perpetuating things like this to occur. 
-------------------- 
According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Interior and Police, limited 
acceptance of applications: potential beneficiaries exceeds 53,000 people but just about 
8,755 had been accepted.188 Of the 8,755 people who qualified for the process of 
naturalization, a large number had been receiving letters during the months of March-
April by the ministry, where they were asked to provide additional documentation that 
they had deposited. 
Regardless, they will remain at high risk of statelessness until they apply for 
Dominican nationality in two years, especially those who achieve the 2nd phase and 
obtain a migration card with an unknown nationality. Less than 20% of Group B had a 
chance to benefit from the naturalization process due to multiple obstacles, ranging from 
the lack of information, denial of hospital registration, notariedad acts, transport costs and 
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various legalizations.189 Group B continues to have contstant warnings of deportation 
since the government regularly generates an atmosphere of tension and insecurity for 
Dominicans of Haitian descent. Even if they have  documents, nothing will guarantee that 
deportations are not carried out discriminately, as they have always been based on racial 
criteria.  
VI. Vulnerabilities caused by Law 169-14 
 As stated before, there are several vulnerabilites that are caused by the 
implementation of law 169-14 towards both groups A and B.  
Journal 9 
September 3, 2015 
Before I left, my father I went to Salcedo, the town where my parents were raised. 
Michelle lives there and I was hoping to see him to see how his naturalization process 
was going. My dad and I went to see my grandparent’s house, and that’s where we saw 
one of Michelle’s friends who told us Michelle was at work. At least that’s what we 
thought. A few hours later, I saw Michelle in the back of his friend’s motorcycle and in 
a hurry. Apparently he had forgotten his probationary identification card when the 
police had stopped him and asked where it was. Since he did not have it they took 
away his bike and told him he would have to find a way to go home and get it. Without 
any phone and late to work he had no option but to walk home until one of his friends 
saw him and gave him a ride. I could not believe it at first but the police even asked my 
father questions on our way to Salcedo. However since he was with my uncle— an 
ironically whiter Dominican he was not stopped. Someone ended up calling my dad to 
help Michelle out since he ended up going to police station for asking for his 
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motorcycle back. Michelle said that what hurt him the most was that he ended up not 
going to work and not buying his daughter milk for the week.  
 
---------------------- 
Comparingly, the article “Women of Haitian Descent Bear the Brunt of 
Dominican Migration Policy” by Ivet Gonzalez, mentions how women of haitian 
descent are constantly afraid of being deported. 190 Lilian Dolis, head of the local NGO 
Dominican-Haitian Women’s Movement (MUDHA), stated that “this process has a 
greater impact on women because when a son or a daughter is denied their Dominican 
identity, the mothers are directly responsible for failing to legalize their status.”191 The 
deportation have only increased and since August of 2015 the police have been 
carrying out continuous raids, and undocumented immigrants are taken to camps along 
the border, to be deported to Haiti. According to official figures, the Dominican 
Republic’s migration authorities deported 15,754 undocumented Haitian immigrants 
from August 2015 to January 2016, while 113,320, including 23,286 minors, 
voluntarily returned home. 192  Undocumented immigrants (stateless persons) can’t 
work, study or have a public life,” Dolis said. “They go directly into domestic service 
or work in the informal sector. And even if they have documents, Haitian-Dominican 
women are always excluded from social programs.”193Abreu, known by her nickname 
“the Spider”, said “women sell clothes or food, they apply hair extensions, they’re 
domestic employees and some are sex workers. Abreu raised an interesting point in 
that many suffer from police abuse – the police take their carts and merchandise when 	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they don’t have documents.” Thus, demonstrating how women become the most 
vulnerable due to lack of documentation caused by statelessness.  
As previously discussed in Chapter 1 through the Thailand Report, statelessness is 
said to place people at a higher risk for trafficking. Human trafficking is defined as 
modern day slavery, or as “the recruitment, harboring, transporting, provision, or 
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for 
the purposes of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”. 
194 The trafficking of persons occurs in all countries of the world— domestically and 
internationally— and does not discriminate against women, men, and children. According 
to the International Labour Organization, “nearly 21 million people are victims of forced 
labor across the world, trapped in jobs which they were coerced or deceived into and 
which they cannot leave”. Furthermore, developing nations encompass the largest 
amounts since “the Asia- Pacific region accounts for the largest number of forced 
laborers in the world (56%) of the global total, followed by Africa (18%) and Latin 
America at (9%)”.195 
The trafficking of persons is divided into two divisions— labor trafficking and 
sex trafficking. From these two categories, sex trafficking is a debatable issue because it 
is a controversy deciding who is a victim and how to support them. Nonetheless, human 
trafficking, specifically the trafficking of women for sexual labors, is a human security 
issue. According to the most recent Trafficking in Persons Report in 2015, the 
government indicated that there had been more victims to care for in 2014, and continued 
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efforts aimed at preventing human trafficking.196 In addition, after the government 
installed a national hotline in 2014, they received 232 reports of gender-based violence 
and trafficking cases.197 However, they saw an increase in the types of persons who were 
most vulnerable to trafficking. For instance as states in the report, “the government began 
implementing a naturalization law that provides a path to citizenship for persons affected 
by the 2013 Constitutional Tribunal ruling, but a sizeable group may be left without legal 
status, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking”. 198 These conditions made them 
vulnerable to exploitation in forced labor and sex trafficking. While there were no official 
reports of victims being punished for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being 
subjected to trafficking, undocumented Haitian victims faced the risk of deportation and 
other penalties resulting from their irregular immigration status.199 
Nevertheless, there also continues to be Dominicans of Haitian descent whom are 
being smuggled back into the Dominican Republic through borders like Dajabón. As 
stated in the article, “Para disminuir el tráfico ilegal de haitianos: Hechos, y no la 
cháchara patriotera” (to decrease the smuggling of illegal Haitians) Carmen Suárez 
analyzes why “Haitian labor is essential today for the construction industry, for tourism, 
for agribusiness and for the unskilled and poorly paid work as concierge, night 
surveillance, among others.”200 Dominicans are not the only ones whom benefit from 
smuggling, illegal haitians do as well. According to the CEFASA report on “Smuggling 
from Haiti to Santiago, RD” illegal immigrants, wether illegal haitian-dominicans or just 
Haitians, are used to the type of labor that they may be getting into and are willing to 	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make sacrifices for a better life. 201 The report found that most illegal immigrants being 
smuggled were from the ages of 18-35, utilized motorcycles as their method of transport, 
paid the “buscones” or smugglers whom were of their nationality and most would come 
on market day when the borders were not as heavily supervised.202 However, the report 
does point out that there are several illegal immigrants whom are smuggled into the 
Dominican Republic and have a different expectation of their jobs versus what they 
actually come to do (ex. Domestic worker vs. sex worker). 203  
Nevertheless, author Suárez admits that smuggling illegal migrants is not the right 
thing to do, especially when the police does it. These Dominicans of Haitian descent and 
illegal Haitians migrated and stayed with the help of corrupt military that guard the 
border.204 Suarez’s solution to illegal migration and smuggling is to start by controling 
the border to not only aid the country, but also prevent smugglers from becoming 
trafficked once they are inside of the country. 205 
 
Statelessness and human insecurity  
Human security ensues the ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ by 
addressing the combination of risks and vulnerabilities within communities. These 
vulnerabilities may include ‘freedom from want’ risks— not having an adequate standard 
of living due to no income and debt bondage— as well as vulnerabilities under ‘freedom 
from fear’— being sexually molested, and being captive without freedom of movement. 
As Aradau states in Rethinking Trafficking in Women, “the victims’ suffering is an abuse 	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of human rights, which can only be rectified by reinstating those rights”.206 Therefore, 
through the broad dimensions of human security— ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom 
from fear’— it is important to prioritize the lives of the victims by identifying victims of 
forced labor without victimizing them during immigration and criminal procedures.  
 
 The Dominican Republic has recently become Brazil’s competitor in the economy 
of human trafficking. According to the Office of International Immigration (OIM), “a 
large quantity of women and children are victims of sex trafficking in the Dominican; 
however, many Dominicans believe that it is the government’s job to find solutions. 207 
Nonetheless, it is not only the government’s job, but also the nation’s job as a whole, to 
gather resources and mobilize solutions for its trafficking victims. In the Dominican 
Republic, trafficking has finally been placed on the political agenda. However, countries 
like the Dominican Republic need to put a heavier emphasis on human security threats 
that continue to chronically worsen, especially when dealing with statelessness. The 
Dominican Republic also suffers three times as much trafficking since it is “the origin, 
transit, and destination of sex trafficking” occurs.208 Consequently, trafficking in the 
Dominican Republic continues to threaten human security dimensions, including 
personal security and economic security.  
In the case of trafficking, the first priority that needs attention is personal security, 
specifically gendered security, which “appears as a set of threats, assaults, mistreatment, 
injuries, and harm associated with the exclusion, subordination, discrimination, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Aradau, Claudia. Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 34. Print. 
207 Peguero, Ana. "República Dominicana Es El Tercer País Del Mundo Con Mayor Trata De 
Personas." Diariolibre.com. Diario Libre, 23 Sept. 2013. Web. 10 Mar. 2015. 
208 Vizcaino, Patricia. "República Dominicana Es El País Con Más Víctimas De Trata En La 
Región." -. El Dia, 25 Mar. 2014. Web. 13 Mar. 2015. 
	  63	  
exploitation of women”.209 Feminicide continues to increase through marital violence, 
since “more women are killed at the hands of their partners or former partners than in any 
other country in the region, according to a review by the Gender Equality Observatory of 
Latin America and the Caribbean”.210 In many instances, broken homes drive women 
into prostitution, and are coerced into sex trafficking. These women live in continuous 
fear that they or their loved ones will get hurt, or that they will get turned into criminals 
since prostitution is legal in the Dominican Republic, but only when conducted without 
pimps. It is important for “governments to develop and implement policies to identify 
trafficking victims who are forced to participate in criminal activity in the course of their 
victimization, and provide them with appropriate protective services,” and thus, promotes 
the representation of personal security in trafficking.211 
Another priority mostly seen by illegal immigrants and stateless persons in the 
Dominican Republic is economic security for victims of human trafficking. In the 
Dominican Republic, the unemployment rate is one of the highest in the region at nearly 
15%. 212Therefore, women search for other alternatives to supply for their families, and 
are often tricked into sex work. Nordstrom states that globalized exploitation through the 
informal economy is a human security issue, and thus, trafficking continues to be part of 
the shadow economy. One of the main problems with trafficking victims is what occurs 
to them once they have been found. For instance, “victims of trafficking around the 	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world have broken free from exploitation only to find themselves locked in so-called 
shelters that more closely resemble detention centers than havens of support and safety”. 
213A shelter should be a place where victims not only have freedom of movement, but 
also find a way to reintegrate back into the world. After having been forced laborers, 
these victims need outlets to empower themselves either through counseling, education, 
or self-satisfying employment in order to economically sustain themselves. Reducing 
economic vulnerability is essential to increasing human security for both men and 
women who have been trafficked because they cannot access their livelihoods and 
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CHAPTER FOUR- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATELESSNESS AND 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
I. Introduction 
De jure stateless Haitian-Dominicans in the Dominican Republic have had 
various consequences for their state of being— the most vulnerable: human smuggling 
and trafficking. Due to the state’s corruptive police force, the police continue to 
economically take advantage of stateless Haitian-Dominicans when they are smuggled 
back into the Dominican Republic illegally or other countries.214 In addition, the 2015 
Trafficking in Persons Report in the Dominican Republic pointed out that after “the 
government began implementing a naturalization law that provides a path to 
citizenship for persons affected by the 2013 Constitutional Tribunal ruling, but a 
sizeable group may be left without legal status, increasing their vulnerability to 
trafficking”.215  
As such, there must also be a focus on victims of human trafficking in the 
Dominican Republic— specifically those that might not be considered citizens. One 
case specifically occurred this past December when 19 military officers and migration 
inspectors who were imprisoned for trafficking Dominicans, Haitians and Haitian-
Dominicans into the United States.216 Claudia Rodriguez, journalist for El Caribe, 
explains that there were people leaving the country with exit restriction, people with 
fake visas, and people without proper accreditation of the original passports allegedly 
accusing the Dirección General de Migración (General Immigration Department).217 	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Rodriguez also states that the United States Embassy had been following this case for 
over 6 months but it was not until December 18th, 2015 that they finally obtained arrest 
warrants, searches and other procedural acts to detain the military officers.218 As such, 
human trafficking is an example of the state targeting the most vulnerable populations 
in the Dominican Republic— stateless Haitian- Dominicans being one of them.  
II. The Nexus between Statelessness and Human Trafficking 
As mentioned in chapter one, Ayten Gündogdu, author of Rightlessness in an 
Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants attempts 
to address the situation through a human security perspective by recognizing the lack 
of rightlessness of stateless persons.219 According to Gündogdu, “Ardent’s notion of 
“rightlessness,” highlighting a fundamental condition that can undermine the very 
possibility of claiming and exercising even the rights that one formally has, draws 
attention to what gets lost in this conventional frame and renders statelessness more 
comparable to structural problems such as poverty, racial inequality, and 
patriarchy”.220 Gündogdu offers the example in that instead of tackling patriarchy as a 
structural problem, activist for women’s rights focus on violence against women and 
highlight bodily harm in order to be able to assign responsibility for identifiable 
violations. 221  Consequently, this is problematic since the structural problem of 
statelessness is not being addressed but only the affects of its structure. Thus, when it 
comes to the issue of statelessness and human trafficking mostly its consequences are 
dealt with— creating refugee camps and trafficking victim assistance— instead of the 
structural problem that create statelessness and trafficking in the first place.  	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Nevertheless, as shown through the Haitian-Dominican case study, it is 
essential to place statelessness and human trafficking in the same conversation since 
statelessness and human trafficking are intertwined through internal root causes. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, The Nexus Between Statelessness and Human Trafficking in 
Thailand (Thailand report) is one of the only empirically accurate studies ever done on 
this topic. This report focuses on the difference in experiences between stateless 
persons and citizens and their proneness to being trafficked. As stated in The Hague 
Institute for Global Justice, this study was able to examine external and internal root 
causes (such as poverty, lack of education, or risk-taking behavior) that can expose an 
individual to a higher risk of trafficking.222  
Through their research, they were able to conclude that stateless persons may 
intrinsically be more likely to fall prey to trafficking because they seek a better life 
away from home at a higher rate than citizens. Furthermore, stateless persons may 
become exploited at a higher rate than citizens in the process of seeking a better life 
away from their country of origin.223 Therefore, what truly matters when trying to 
understand the connection between statelessness and human trafficking is the risk that 
stateless persons may have due to external and internal root causes that can expose 
them to human trafficking.  
 
III. Relatable recommendations from the Thailand Report to the Dominican 
Republic 
As part of their research, the group of experts also came up with possible 
recommendations that could aid the hill tribe community, the government of Thailand, 
and international organizations in identifying factors that could be considered as 	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facilitating exploitative practices of stateless hill tribe people. As stated in the Thailand 
report, “many of what we have called the external root causes of trafficking requires a 
long term intervention at governmental level. Intervention strategies should be focused 
on improving the ability to cope with situations of crisis both in the community and 
outside the community— including so as to prevent a crisis becoming a trigger for 
trafficking”224. This is essential and can also be applied to the Haitian-Dominican 
statelessness case because the crisis of statelessness became a trigger for trafficking 
and smuggling Haitian-Dominicans. Therefore, the following recommendations are 
important in analyzing any stateless and trafficking nexus case.  
According to the Thailand report, interventions targeted to improve stateless 
people’s coping strategies in case of acute crisis will decrease stateless hill tribe 
people’s vulnerability to exploitative practices.225 NGOs, in close cooperation with 
community leaders, could establish a crisis fund within the community, which is 
equally accessible to citizen and stateless inhabitants in times of need.226 NGO’s could 
also initiate or enhance projects for stateless young women in the hill tribe 
communities to utilize micro credit opportunities to secure a position in which they are 
able to generate a higher and more reliable income.227 This recommendation can also 
be applicable to the Haitian-Dominican stateless case because Haitian-Dominican 
women are the most vulnerable. As mentioned in Chapter 3, many stateless Haitian-
Dominican women are excluded from social programs and result to selling food, 
clothes, or working illegally in domestic service. As recommended by the Thailand 
report, if stateless women could utilize micro credits to secure opportunities that they 	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are already creating for themselves illegally they would not have to conform to the 
shadow economy.  
Furthermore, interventions can be targeted at creating a safe and familiar 
environment for hill tribe people when outside the village, such as awareness of the 
risks. Within the communities, NGOs can initiate regular preparatory meetings for 
young hill tribe (stateless) people who want to migrate.228 This also relates to the case 
of Haitian-Dominican stateless persons because many were unjustly deported back to 
Haiti as they signed off on papers that made them foreigners instead. Many were not 
aware of the exploitation following migration back to Haiti. As stated in the article 
“Haitian Deportation Crisis Brews in the Dominican Republic,” Josue Fiallo, an 
adviser to the Dominican ministry of the presidency, mentions that many people are 
still waiting for Haiti to issue them passports and proper documents so they can apply 
to the immigration programs. 229 Although some Haitian-Dominicans are by law still 
considered Haitians due to Haiti’s Jus Sanguini (having at least one parent as citizens 
of the state) many still run into problems when migrating back since they do not have 
any family members left or do not speak French or Creole, among other risks. 230 
Moreover, it is important to create avenues for safe migration. The socio-
economic needs of people in rural areas are immediate, such that they will continue to 
move irregularly or regularly and it is important to make sure people who migrate do 
so in a safe and informed way.231 As specified in the Thailand report, “stateless people 
below the age of 35 are at increased risk when leaving the community for work.232 
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They seem to be easy targets for exploitative practices as they are often in need of 
generating an income with limited options to do so in the villages and will not go to the 
police in case of exploitative practices.233 Another factor that impacts on stateless 
people’s vulnerability in various ways is lack of education and as such, the government 
should enable stateless people to make use of education loans and creating reliable and 
accessible service points. This is something that is very relatable to Haitian-
Dominicans since many have been stripped away of a quality education and are being 
forced to find work instead. For instance, Karina, 35, was born in the Dominican 
Republic to Haitian parents, and registered as a Dominican national. 234Although she 
obtained a valid identification card at 18, Karina says that when she was 24, the 
government refused to issue her documents necessary to enroll in university, allegedly 
because her claim to nationally was under investigation. 235Unable to continue her 
studies, Karina began working as a chambermaid in a large beach resort, where she has 
been for past 10 years.236  
Gaining confidence in the police is of pivotal when people have got into trouble 
e.g. an exploitative situation is also very important. 237However, in this regard it is 
important to first find out about the level of legal empowerment: what are the formal 
options open to stateless people to go to the police.238 Something that the Thailand 
Report does point out is that “further research by independent academic researchers is 
required on the reasons why stateless hill tribe people distrust the police to study the 
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extent of discriminatory practices and corruption within the Thai police”. 239  In 
comparison, this would also be a very useful study in understanding the corruption of 
the military police in the Dominican Republic towards Haitian-Dominican stateless 
persons and Haitians overall. 
Finally, the goal should for stateless persons to acquire citizenship in order to 
alleviate the increased vulnerability to exploitative practices experiences by those who 
are stateless.240 In the case of the hill tribe communities in Thailand, in light of the 
reported difficulties in going outside the villages to start the application procedure it 
would be a good ideas to explore possibilities to start the procedures in the villages 
itself for instance through the deployment of mobile teams from the district offices to 
the villages. This could also be applicable in the Dominican Republic since many 
provinces also do not have registration offices and many stateless persons have 
problems reaching the registration offices.241 
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Figure 1. Map of the Dominican Republic (Provinces without registration offices) 
 
As stated in the Thailand report, UNHCR, in cooperation with NGOs and law 
clinics working on citizenship can help to facilitate the establishment and 
implementation of such mobile outreach activities. In addition and because many of 
the stateless people who participate in the research seem to be eligible for citizenship 
they should initiate activities for information, counseling and where necessary also 
legal assistance on acquiring citizenship.242 Nevertheless, international intervention 
and NGOs can only do so much. Consequently, it is essential for the government of 
Thailand and the government of the Dominican Republic to stop evading the issues of 
statelessness causing vulnerabilities like human trafficking. Therefore, governments 	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like Thailand and the Dominican Republic must act with concrete recommendations 
that address the structural problems and not solely the consequences.  
IV. Recommendation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
In 1959, the Organizanization of American States (OAS), responsible for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in the Americas created the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (CIDH) (Comision Interamericana de Derecho 
Humanos (CIDH).243 CIDH is an autonomous body of (OAS) composed of seven 
independent members who act in a personal capacity and is headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. 244In conjunction with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Inter-American Court), established in 1979, is an institution of the inter-American 
system of protection of Human Rights .245 In regards to the issue of Haitian-Dominican 
stateless persons in the Dominican Republic, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights published a report in February 2016 to address possible 
recommendations—targeted towards international intervention and domestic.246  
In its latest report on the situation of stateless Haitian-Dominicans in the 
Dominican Republic the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights made the 
following recommendations to the State:247 
According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Dominican 
Republic should adopt, within a reasonable time the necessary steps to annul all 
standard measures of any kind, whether constitutional, legal, regulatory or 
administrative, as well as any practice, decision, or interpretation, which in effect 
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denies “foreigners” of Dominican nationality.248 Furthermore, the state should adopt, 
legislative measures, including, if necessary, constitutional, administrative and any 
other measures necessary to ensure that all persons born in their territory can be 
registered immediately after birth regardless of their ancestry or origin and 
immigration status of their parents.249 In addition, they must take the necessary 
measures to prevent Law 168-13 and the provisions of Law 169-14 to continue to 
produce legal effects.  
Moreover, the Dominican Rpeublic should take the necessary measures to 
guarantee the right to the nationality of persons who already have this right under the 
existing internal regime between 1929 and 2010.250 The measures to ensure the right to 
nationality of persons harmed by Law 168-13 should be automatic. These mechanisms 
must be simple, clear, fast and fair. They cannot be optional or implemented in a 
discriminatory manner.251  
Furthermore, the state must also ensure that people who were entitled to 
Dominican nationality, but which were not registered in the Dominican Civil Registry 
do not have to register as aliens, as stated by Article 6 of Law No. 169- 14.252 The 
Dominican Republic must also take the necessary measures for Dominicans of Haitian 
descent to have the necessary proof of their identity and Dominican nationality 
documentation measures.253 In addition, the State must take steps to conduct annual 
administrative investigations targeted towards civil, criminal records and 
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documentation relating to judicial proceedings.254 As soon as possible, the state must 
take the necessary measures for Dominicans of Haitian descent who were  not 
registered,  to be registered and have the necessary documentation to prove their 
identity and Dominican nationality.255 
Lastly, within a reasonable time, the state must hold training programs that target 
continuous and permanent issues related to this population in order to ensure: a) no 
more racial profiling in any way, (the reason for detention or expulsion); b) strict 
observance of due process in any proceeding relating to the expulsion or deportation 
of aliens; c) under no circumstances people of Dominican nationality are deported 
and d) no collective expulsions are carried out.256 CHDI’s addresses international 
governments and organizations with its recommendation to  ratify the Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954 and the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness in  1961.257 Perhaps CHDI recommends this because 
international intervention has not been enough for the Dominican Republic to solve 
the stateless issue and ratifuing the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
could compel the Dominican Republic to act on behald of the stateless Haitian-
Dominicans.  
V. Recommendations from Centro Bonó  
Two years after the law was passed 169-14, there still remains an atmosphere of 
tension and uncertainty for most Dominicans of Haitian descent. The purpose of the 
law has not been reached even by any moderately acceptable standards because most 
Dominicans of Haitian descent have suspended civil registrations and as mandated by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  254	  "Recomendaciones De La CIDH Sobre El Derecho a La Nacionalidad Y La Sentencia Del Tribunal 
Constitucional TC/0168/13." RECONOCIDO. CIDH, 18 Feb. 2016. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.	  255	  "Recomendaciones De La CIDH Sobre El Derecho a La Nacionalidad Y La Sentencia Del Tribunal 
Constitucional TC/0168/13." RECONOCIDO. CIDH, 18 Feb. 2016. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.	  256	  "Recomendaciones De La CIDH Sobre El Derecho a La Nacionalidad Y La Sentencia Del Tribunal 
Constitucional TC/0168/13." RECONOCIDO. CIDH, 18 Feb. 2016. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.	  257	  "Recomendaciones De La CIDH Sobre El Derecho a La Nacionalidad Y La Sentencia Del Tribunal 
Constitucional TC/0168/13." RECONOCIDO. CIDH, 18 Feb. 2016. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.	  
	  76	  
the law have not had their documents returned.258 Due to this situation, tens of 
thousands of children and teenagers, children of parents with seized documents  by the 
Central Electoral Board, have not been able to benefit from the positive  aspects of the 
law.259 
If parents and young adults with suspended documents by the JCE have not 
received their restitution of their documents many children, will not be able to receive 
the benefit of their right to documentation. This is an example of corrupt political 
administration, as well as governmental insensitivity that places a large population into 
a vulnerable state, even after two years of the law being implemented. Despite this 
outrageous situation, it should be recognized that this population of stateless Haitian-
Dominican  has remained in a responsible civic attitude, systematically demanding 
their rights through institutional channels, utilizing peaceful methods of political 
advocacy and social mobilization. Unfortunately the responsible authorities who 
should be demanding accountability to the JCE have remained  complacent and 
complicit for the breach of law 169-14.260 
For Group A, the JCE has failed to fulfill the mandate of this law as it only 
continues the bureaucratic path and administrative processes to outlaw beneficiarias to 
resort to the same slow processes and economic cost that they can not afford.261 The 
few electoral identity cards that have been obtained have difficulties when appearing in 
the system. From a load of  over 900 cases that have been  monitored from the 
implementation of the law, less than 500 have managed to have their documentation 
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and those who have received it, a large majority has limited use for their 
documentation as they cannot exercise their civil and political rights.262 
 Furthermore, the constraints imposed by the process of naturalization for 
Group B stateless Haitian-Dominicans, for example, has questioned the optimism 
generated at the beginning of the adoption of the Law 169-14. Particularly, Law 169-
14  was expected to prevent underreporting of people born in the country and to 
address the right to citizenship for people born in the Dominican soil like Group B — 
except for children of diplomats and foreigners in transit. However, the procedures for 
applying in the process of naturalization under the Act 169-14 for group B generated 
many difficulties. These difficulties have been reported throughout the whole process 
of practicing the law and the authorities have not done anything with the feedback that 
NGOs have made in regards to the obstacles presented in the application of Law 169-
14.263 For these reason, it is imporant to recognize that with regards to the objectives of 
the Law 169-14 towards Group B, the results have been insufficient.  
Only about 8,750 people from Group B managed qualify for naturalization.264 
Tens of thousands of them could not due to obstacles in the application of the law, 
including administrative inability of hospitals to deliver the records of live births, 
hindrances to the process of realization of notized acts, increased costs for judicial 
legalizations, among other factors.265 The state's refusal to recognize the effects of 
these obstacles to assessing the limited time that this group has affect the legitimacy of 
the law. This component of the law does not allow success. Its benefits are clearly 
inadequate and have no political sense to insist otherwise. The politically convinient 	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recommendation is to review the path of the current law and relaunch a more 
commitmented naturalization process for Group B with less obstacles.266 Judging by 
the results indicated by Law 169-14 solving statelessness remains a challenge for the 
state and the Dominican society. It is important to improve the results of this law and 
communicate with thruthfullness what has been happening to improve the political 
climate and social coexistence among the entire populationn. The Dominican Republic 
is responsible for the future civil registration and return of its documentation to 
Dominicans of Haitian descent. If not, this will remain a human rights challenge of the 
present and the future.  
 
VI. Recommendation from Red Jesuita con Migrantes  
Red Jesuita con Migrantes is a non-profit from the Dominican Republic that has 
been monitoring the process of Haitain-Dominican deportaions from January- June 
2015. They focused on cases of unjust deportations of Haitian-Dominicans to Haiti. 
For instance, According to the data provided by the Specialized Border Security Corps 
(Cesfront) and the Dominican National Army, on January 2015, at least 13,000 illegal 
Haitian immigrants were arrested and returned to their country of origin— Haiti.267 
According to Red Jesuita Migrantes, the Dominican Republic continues to demand 
sovereignty by controlling the migratory flow, but the problem is that these 
mechanisms have been outside of international fundamental rights of migrants.  
As such, the Dominican Republic should utilize mechanisms that do not go 
outside of signed international agreements, and violate the Dominican Constitution, the 
rules of the immigration law, but instead aid equality of stateless persons before the 	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Traslashuellasdigital.com.do |:." Traslashuellasdigitalcomdo. Raslashuellasdigitalcomdo, 3 Jan. 2015. 
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law. Consequently, Red Jesuits Migrantes assisted the government with possible 
recommendaitons to stop the violation of immigration laws and criminal practices 
towards stateless Haitain-Dominicans.268 
For effective control the Dominican State must adopt clear mechanisms, designed 
to make use of its sovereignty to provide equality of all people before the law. In other 
words, the Dominican State must aid to stop the internal root causes of statelessness, 
such as police corruption, financial deterrence, increased costs for judicial 
legalizations, bureaucratic health and education system, Antihaitianismo, 
discrimination in the work environment and social security.  
Some of these recommended mechanims include:  The implementation of a 
mechanism for rapid and effective naturalization process, where people who have not 
violated the immigration law are not subjected to long hours of waiting while 
inspectors investigate documentation.269 This is an essential point that must be fixed 
since may stateless persons have had to miss work to wait for long hours to only 
investigate their possibly documentation materials.  
Disclosure and dissemination through the media, by the General Directorate of 
Migration, of statistics on deportacions produced monthly is also very important.270 
This is necessary in order to produce proposal that can be analyzed and discussed by 
all agencies that deal with immigration, specially the JCE. There must also be a record 
of deportees, updated and published in both embassies and office to access to 
information from the General Directorate of Immigration, to safeguard and strengthen 
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(2015): 1-10. Web. 3 Feb. 2016. 
 269	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compliance and for people to know the whereabouts of their relatives.271 This is 
perhaps one of the most essential recommendations since the Dominican Republic 
continues to aid problems for migrants that are underage— a population that is 
notoriably more vulnerable to human trafficking.272  
A judicial body must be created to assess and issue any deportation and as such, 
migrants must have the right to be legally represented before deportation proceedings 
to ensure non-deportation of children under age, and that families are not separated.273 
In additon, an extensive time devoted to human rights training to all who are involved 
in the arrests and deportacions of migrants. A system where agents are identified with a 
photo, name and position should be established in order to justly legitimaze 
deportations of stateless Haitian-Dominicans and to punish the immigration agents, the 
Armed Forces and National Police who extort migrants.274 Human rights training 
would aid in deteorating Antihatianism as one of the causes of unjust deportantions.  
Furthermore, the Dominican government and the Haitian government should 
further train their military, police, and migration in  human rights to focus on 
Dominican-Haitian bilateral relations, with the intent to deter, monitor, prevent and 
eliminate all form of discrimination, xenophobia, racism and violations of rights. 
Greater transparency and organization in the operation of Haitian detention center 
is needed.275 For instance, there must be regulation of relatives visiting detainees, avoid 
overcrowding, adapt a place for detainees to have a minimum comfort that guarantees 
their dignity, improve feeding of detainees so that they can have access to drinking 	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water, and lastly, ease of a court interpreter. Finally, effective control at border points, 
by Dominican Republic and Haiti is necessary to prevent irregular migration flows in 
border areas and prosecute trafficking networks.276 Consequently, this would aid in the 
fight against statelessness and human trafficking because borders would be more 
attentive and less corrupt. 
The Dominican State should focus its energy to encourage civil society and 
the authorities towards raising awareness on border relations, multiculturalism, 
Haitian-Dominicans having their own identity, respect for human rights and 
reconciliation in order to develop a true culture of peace. To request the governments 
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, authorities and international organizations must 
take initiative to strategize economic investments needed to motivate the eradication of 
such harsh conditions of poverty, insecurity and violence that are living in the 
Dominican Republic.  
 
VII. Targeting Internal Root Causes to Unravel Statelessness and Human 
trafficking in the Dominican Republic 
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Centro Bonó, Red Jesuita con 
Migrantes, have made several recommendations of how the Dominican Republic 
should be dealing with the structural problems of statelessness that has made Haitian-
Dominicans more vulnerable to human trafficking. This has not only been justified by 
the increase in human trafficking from the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report for the 
Dominican Republic, the trafficking case of 19 military police officers, but also  
internal root causes. The internal root causes, some created by Law 169-14, such as 
deportation, and others historically engrained in the Dominican Republic, like 
Antihaitinismo, in conjunction with the state of being a de jure stateless person has 	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created more vulnerability for Haitian-Dominicans stateless persons. De jure stateless 
Haitian-Dominican referred to as “persons who are not nationals of any State, either 
because at birth or subsequently they were not given any nationality, or because during 
their lifetime they lost their own nationality and did not acquire a new one,” are at a 
higher risk of becoming human traffic because they are unfit to deal with the crisis of 
ambiguous citizenship. 277  This is why the Thailand report recommends for 
communities to have a ‘crisis fund’ for stateless persons.278 
The Dominican Republic must make the same commitment to solving 
statelessness as they have to human trafficking. Solving one issue will not make the 
other disappear, but instead will worsen both structural problems. The main issue with 
de jure statelessness in the Dominican Republic is that Law 169-14, created to fix 
statelessness did not work. The Naturalization Plan targeted towards Group A and 
Group B Haitian-Dominicans stateless persons expired on June 17, 2015.279 It only 
created more problems with the combination of internal root causes that Haitian-
Dominicans are already exposed to such as, economic uncertainty, police extortion as 
best described by Michele Fadeus’s experience and Antihaitinismo. Therefore, since 
Law 169-14 was not successful in preventing statelessness, there must be a retroactive 
law that reframes and addresses citizenship and Haitian-Dominican identity in the 
Dominican Republic. 
In the case of de jure Haitian-Dominican stateless persons what matters when 
trying to understand the connection between statelessness and human trafficking is the 
risk that de jure Haitian-Dominican stateless persons have due to internal root causes 
that can expose them to human trafficking. These include police corruption, financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 A Study of Statelessness. Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1949. 8. Print.  
278 Rijken, Conny, Laura Van Waas, Martin Gramatikov, and Deidre Brennan. "The Nexus between 
Statelessness and Human Trafficking in Thailand." Wolf Legal Publishers, 2015. Web. 
279 Perez, Celso. "We Are Dominican." Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, 01 July 2015. Web. 
16 Dec. 2016. 	  
	  83	  
limitation, increased costs for judicial legalizations, bureaucratic health and education 
system, Antihaitianismo, discrimination in the work environment and social security. 
Statelessness and human trafficking are both human rights violations that must be 
























Transcribed interview Michelle Fadeus 
 
 
Entrevista con  Michelle Fadeus 
        Mi tema de investigación es analizar los efectos de la Corte Suprema de 2013 
República Dominicana que despojó a la ciudadanía de más de 250.000 domínico-
haitianos y el vinculo del aumento del tráfico de los migrantes irregulares y deportados 
en la República Dominicana. Voy a analizar la historia de los domínico-haitianos en la 
República Dominicana como un grupo minoritario, las inseguridades que han sufrido 
las mujeres—el género más vulnerables. Con el fin de reunir información sobre los 
migrantes haitiano-dominicanas, voy a entrevistar a domínico-haitianos de Grupo A 
sobre el proceso de adquisición de la ciudadanía permanente. Sobre todo analizare 
publicaciones sobre los derechos humanos de los migrantes de las organizaciones para 
llevar a cabo estudios etnográficos sobre las vulnerabilidades de diferentes grupos 
sociales en la República Dominicana. 
 
English Translation:  
My proposed topic of research is to analyze the affects of the 2013 Dominican 
Republic Supreme Court ruling that stripped the citizenship of over 250,000 Haitian-
Dominicans and link to the increase of sex trafficking of irregular migrants and 
deportees in the Dominican Republic. I will analyze the history of Haitian-Dominicans 
in the Dominican Republic as a minority group, the insecurities they have suffered and 
the most vulnerable gender— women. In order to gather information on Haitian-
Dominican migrants, I will interview Haitian-Dominicans about the process of 
acquiring their permanent citizenship, analyze publications on human rights of 
migrants from organizations and perform ethnographic studies on different societal 





Anabel: "¿Cuál es su nombre?" 
Michelle: "Michelle Fadeus" 
Anabel: "¿Dónde nació usted?" 
Michelle: "Nací en una pequeña ciudad en la República Dominicana" 
Anabel: "¿Cuántos años tienes?" 
Michelle: "Tengo 28 años de edad" 
Anabel: "¿Cómo se identifica  sí mismo, ya sea raza, etnia o nacionalidad? Por 
ejemplo, mi origen étnico es Dominicana y mi raza es española y africano—debido a 
mis antepasados " 
Michelle: "Me identifico mi mismo como dominicana, así, sin embargo, mis padres 
son ambos de Haití, pero mi abuela del lado de mi madre es cubana". 
Anabel: "Oh, wow, no tenía ni idea!" 
Michelle: "Sí" 
Anabel: "¿Tienes familia en Haití?" 
Michelle: "Sí. Mi padre aún vive en Haití y la mayor parte de mi familia vive 
realmente en Haití " 
Anabel: "¿Qué estás solicitando específicamente?" 
Michelle: "Estoy solicitando mi ciudadanía desde que me la quitaron " 
Anabel: "¿Cuál es la  importaría, por favor explica con más detalle cómo y por qué?" 
Michelle: "Bueno, yo nací aquí y he tenido mi cédula (tarjeta de certificación)" 
Anabel: "¿Cómo fue el proceso de solicitud para recibir su cédula? 
Michelle: "En realidad, no he recibido mi tarjeta oficial, ya que ha sido un proceso de 
un año, con la burocracia extrema, largos días de ir a la Junta Central Electoral, la 
recopilación de todos mi documentos— algunos de mis padres-haitiana están  
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desaparecidos " 
Anabel: "¿Cuál ha sido la parte más difícil de este proceso?" 
Michelle: "Creo que desde que nació mi hija y ella también es dominicana-al igual que 
su madre también, tratando de averiguar su trabajo de papel desde que nació hace dos 
años y nadie que nació el pasado 2007 se permite aplicar para la ciudadanía " 
Anabel: "¿Pero cómo es posible que desde que nació aquí, y el hospital tiene su 
certificado de nacimiento y el papeleo?" 
Michelle: "Debido a que los hospitales son la identificación de ciertos hijos de padres 
sin ciudadanía como los haitianos. Sin embargo, ya que la madre es totalmente 
Dominicana estamos utilizando eso para ayudar a demostrar que ella es de hecho un 
ciudadano dominicano ". 
Anabel: "En su opinión, ¿cree que la ley 168-14 realmente está ayudando a las 
personas a recuperar su ciudadanía?" 
Michelle: "No necesariamente. He vivido aquí toda mi vida, mi vida es la República 
Dominicana. Pensé que ya era un ciudadano y ahora tengo que pasar por tantos 
obstáculos para recuperar lo que nací. No tiene sentido. También sé que hay tantas 
personas racistas y que simplemente hacen que el proceso sea mucho más difícil de lo 
que debe ser ". 
Anabel: "¿Hay la posibilidad de que algún día retornes a Haití ya que la mayoría de su 
familia vive allí?" 
Michelle: "En realidad no, sólo para visitar ya que siempre hago, pero esta es mi casa y 
donde quiero que mi hija crezca". 
Anabel: "¿Te siente seguro en la República Dominicana?" 
Michelle: "Independientemente de lo que está pasando y la totalidad de la 
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